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TAKING STOCK: CHINA’S FIRST DECADE OF FREE TRADE
JUN ZHAO* & TIMOTHY WEBSTER**
ABSTRACT
China has established itself as a global economic power in the
past ten years. This article explains one important but overlooked
aspect of this rise, China’s new free trade agreements (FTAs).
After situating China’s FTA boom within a framework of
international political economy and recent regional rise, this Article
probes the question of how China selects its FTA partners,
referencing U.S. trade practice and policy as a framework with
which to analyze China’s own preferences. We then explore the
main features of China’s FTAs, finding that it has adopted a
flexible FTA strategy that both attends to its own socioeconomic
prerogatives and closely matches partner expectations.
A
conclusion discusses the guiding principles of China’s FTA
strategy and offers concrete proposals to guide the future of
China’s international economic law and policy.
1.

INTRODUCTION

China’s rise to prominence scarcely needs introduction at this
point. Its steady economic growth over the past three decades
captures headlines the world over.
This success has been
attributed largely to China’s careful tending of its domestic
economy, so many wise policy decisions to attract foreign domestic
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investment, to form joint ventures with leading foreign companies,
and to corporatize China’s state-owned enterprises. But China’s
influence stretches far beyond its shores. As a global economic
power, China’s footprint comprises over a trillion dollars in U.S.
treasury bonds, 1 multi-billion dollar investments in AngloAustralian mining companies,2 labyrinthine infrastructure projects
snaking throughout Africa, 3 and bilateral trade agreements with
several Latin American countries.4 These outward advances have
helped position China as the world’s second largest economy, and
its largest exporter. 5 Scarcely a week goes by without China
becoming another country’s largest trading partner.6
Part of China’s transformation from regional player to global
power is a growing web of international legal obligations. In the
early 1980s, as China took the first steps toward reforming the
economy, it played a passive role in international organizations,
1
See Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, U.S. TREASURY (2011),
http://www.ustreas.gov/tic/mfh.txt (noting China is the largest holder of U.S.
treasury bonds ($1173.5 billion), ahead of Japan ($914.8 billion) and the UK ($352.3
billion).
2
See Chinese Investment in Rio Tinto, BBC NEWS, Feb. 12, 2009,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7885111.stm (noting that China would double its
investments to take an eighteen percent share of the mining giant).
3 See generally Howard French, The Next Empire, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May
2010, at 59 (describing Chinese investment in oil production, mining, agriculture,
and other fields).
4 These include FTAs with Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica.
5 See generally Country Comparison > Economy: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity),
INDEX MUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=0&v=65&l=en (ranking
China as having the second highest GDP based upon purchasing power parity
based upon statistics generated by the CIA World Factbook) (last updated Jan. 1,
2011); Country Comparison > Exports, INDEX MUNDI, http://www.indexmundi.com
/g/r.aspx?c=ci&v=85 (ranking China as the largest exporter based upon statistics
generated by the CIA World Factbook) (last updated Jan. 1, 2011).
6 See, e.g., China Overtakes the US as Japan’s Largest Trading Partner, JAPAN
CORPORATE NEWS NETWORK, Feb. 28, 2008, http://www.japancorp.net
/press_release/17232/china_overtakes_the_us_as_japans_largest_trading_partne
r (reporting that China has become Japan’s largest trading partner); Malcolm
Moore, China Overtakes the US as Brazil’s Largest Trading Partner, TELEGRAPH, May
9, 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance /economics/5296515/Chinaovertakes-the-US-as-Brazils-largest-trading-partner.html (reporting that trade
between China and Brazil reached $3.2 billion, surpassing the United States’ trade
with Brazil); Chris Zappone, China Turns Trade Tables on Japan, BUSINESS DAY, Nov.
19, 2008, http://www.theage.com.au /business/china-turns-trade-tables-onjapan 20081119-6b1d.html (noting that China eclipsed Japan to become Australia’s
leading trade partner).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss1/2

02 ZHAO WEBSTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

10/31/2011 7:34 PM

CHINA’S FIRST DECADE OF FREE TRADE

67

such as the United Nations. 7 “[A] comprehensive network of
linkages” between China and the rest of the world was not
established until the 1980s, when Beijing joined, ”practically all
important international organizations.” 8 In addition, it played
little role in the creation of new groupings.9 In the 1990s, China
took an increasingly extroverted stance in the region, both by
establishing new organizations, such as the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO),10 and by participating more actively in those it
had already joined. By acceding to the WTO in 2001, China joined
another important multilateral organization and deepened
commitments to various forms of economic liberalization, such as
phasing out tariffs on key products, opening up its services market
to foreign companies, and clarifying its trade rules and
regulations. 11 Multilateral settings have thus helped China
7
See, e.g., ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS & GLOBAL SECURITY 222–23 (2007) (“In comparison with its
attitude to international law and international organizations in the 1950s, 1960s,
and even early 1980s, [China’s] acceptance of, and integration into, the
international system have been nothing short of extraordinary.”). Kent draws this
conclusion based on her systematic analysis of China’s participation in four
international legal regimes: security, banking, environment, and human rights.
Though China’s compliance in all four regimes improved between 1980 and 2005,
there was still significant room for further compliance in the last two categories.
See id. at 226 tbl. 1 (documenting China’s overall level of compliance with specific
organizations and treaties between 1980 and 2005). See generally James V.
Feinerman, Chinese Participation in the International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or
Team Player?, 141 CHINA Q. 186 (1995) (analyzing China’s increased involvement
in international organizations as of the late 1970s).
8 Samuel S. Kim, International Organizations in Chinese Foreign Policy, 519
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 140, 140–41 (1992).
9 See Michael Yahuda, China & Regional Co-operation, in CHINA’S PLACE IN
GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS: INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL & DOMESTIC CHALLENGES 102–04
(Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard & Bertel Heurlin eds., 2002) (noting that after China
returned to the U.N. in 1971, the country preferred to only engage in serious
foreign relations discussions under a bilateral framework).
10
“The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is a permanent
intergovernmental international organization creation of which was proclaimed
on” June 15, 2001 in Shanghai, whose main goals are to promote effective
cooperation in various aspects as well as maintaining security and stability
through joint efforts by member countries. Brief Introduction to the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization, THE SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION,
http://www.sectsco.org/EN/brief.asp (last visited Oct. 12, 2011).
11 See BARRY NAUGHTON, THE CHINESE ECONOMY: TRANSITIONS & GROWTH 390–
91 (2006) (explaining how China was required to open up in markets to enter into
complex multilateral bargaining agreements); see also Icksoo Kim, Accession into
the WTO: External Pressure for Internal Reforms in China, 11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 433,
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establish a reputation as a regional power with global ambitions,
but much of China’s diplomatic energy focuses on bilateral
relations, such as the so-called G-2 with the United States, or with
supranational organs such as the EU and ASEAN. 12 Indeed,
China’s profusion of bilateral investment treaties during the 1990s
and 2000s bespeaks its preference for bilateral negotiations.13 A
more recent manifestation of bilateral preferences is its new spate
of FTAs.14
As of July 2011, China entered into eight free trade agreements
or regional trade agreements, with countries as geographically and
developmentally diverse as Chile, New Zealand, Pakistan, and
Singapore, as well as with regional bodies such as ASEAN. During
this same period, China has been negotiating FTAs with neighbors
such as India and Korea and more distant countries or
organizations such as Australia, the Gulf Cooperation Council,
Iceland, and Norway, among others. 15 The emphasis on FTAs
reflects a new stage in the ongoing development of China’s foreign
policy, as well as a growing reliance on international law and legal
institutions to cultivate economic relations. In the words of
China’s Ministry of Commerce, FTAs offer “a new platform to
further opening up to the outside and speeding up domestic

433 (2002) (describing China’s entry into the WTO and how it will contribute to a
systemic transformation of the Chinese economy); Shin-yi Peng, The WTO
Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From the Legal Culture Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L.
& POL’Y J., JUNE 2000, No. 13 (discussing the implications of the WTO dispute
resolution system for East Asian countries in light of cultural differences between
East and West); Pitman B. Potter, China and the International Legal System:
Challenges of Participation, 191 CHINA Q. 699 (2007) (examining “China’s
participation in international legal regimes”).
12 Yahuda, supra note 9, at 103 (“China’s leaders have preferred to conduct
their serious foreign relations in bilateral rather than multilateral frameworks.”).
13 For a complete list of China’s bilateral investment treaties, see Total Number
of Bilateral Investment Treaties Concluded, U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV.
(June 1, 2011), http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite_pcbb/docs/bits_china.pdf.
For a history of China’s policies on BITs, see generally Guiguo Wang, China’s
Practice in International Investment Law: From Participation to Leadership in the World
Economy, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 575 (2009) (reviewing China’s foreign investment laws
and policies during the past three decades).
14 For a detailed discussion of China’s bilateral preference, see infra Section
3.2.
15 See CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/english/index.shtml
(last visited Oct. 4, 2011) (outlining the increasing number of Chinese FTA
partners and FTAs recently signed by China).
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reforms, an effective approach to integrate into [the] global
economy and strengthen economic cooperation with other
economies, as well as particularly an important supplement to the
multilateral trading system.”16
Despite the importance of this new FTA boom, few scholars in
China or the United States have analyzed China’s FTAs, or FTA
policy, in a rigorous or comprehensive fashion. A handful of
working papers address the topic when China first set out on this
trajectory,17 but do not account for the recent surge of FTA activity.
Recent scholarship examines the trend from a comparative angle,18
but fails to address the substance of China’s FTAs, as well as
underlying policy motivations, in significant detail. This Article
contributes to the scholarly discussion by examining FTAs as
specimens of Chinese international economic law and articulating
a framework through which to analyze the motivations and
strategies of China’s law and policymakers.
The argument proceeds in five parts. In the first part, we
establish the theoretical foundations of free trade agreements,
highlighting the dominant methodologies through which to
evaluate FTAs.
In the second part, we examine China’s
globalization, paying particular attention to the processes of
internationalization and regionalization that China has undertaken
over the past twenty years, as well as its participation in bilateral
and multilateral organizations. The third part probes the question
Id.
See, e.g., Agata Antkiewicz & John Whalley, China’s New Regional Trade
Agreements (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10992, 2004),
available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity
/unpan022759.pdf (discussing regional trade agreements China entered after
acceding into the WTO); Yang Zerui, China’s FTA Developments, APEC Study
Center/PECC Trade Forum Conference 2004/HSCC/019 (May 2004),
http://www.pecc.org/resources/doc_view/135-chinas-fta-developments
(discussing China’s FTA policy and strategy); Jiangyu Wang, China’s Regional
Trade Agreements: The Law, Geopolitics, and Impact on the Multilateral Trading System,
8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 119, 119 (2004), available at http://law.nus.edu.sg/sybil
/downloads/current/jiang.pdf (examining China’s negotiation and signing of
regional trade agreements “in the context of the regionalism versus
multilateralism debate in international trade law”).
18 See, e.g., Timothy Webster, Bilateral Regionalism: Paradoxes of East Asian
Integration, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 434, 457–58 (2007) (comparing Japan’s and
China’s FTA race); Claude Barfield, The Dragon Stirs: China’s Trade Policy for Asia-and the World, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 93, 93 (2007) (analyzing “the history of
Chinese trade policy over the past decade”).
16

17
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of how China selects its FTA partners, referencing U.S. trade
practice and policy as a framework by which to analyze China’s
own preferences. The fourth part investigates three of China’s
FTAs in light of the theoretical and practical considerations raised
earlier. Lastly, the fifth part summarizes the guiding principles of
China’s trade and concrete proposals that may be applied to
China’s FTA strategy.
2.

THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS

Policymakers, lawyers, and economists have debated
intensively the benefits and drawbacks of regionalism vis-à-vis
multilateralism, as well as the effects that each might impose on
greater
global
economic
integration
and
multilateral
liberalization. 19 Regionalism can be broadly defined as “a
tendency towards some form of preferential trading arrangements
between a number of countries usually belonging to a particular
region.” 20 Another definition of regionalism is, “any policy
designed to reduce trade barriers between a subset of countries
regardless of whether those countries are actually contiguous or
even close to each other.”21 But multilateralism is much harder to
define. Certain scholars define “multilateralism” as “’coordinating
relations among three or more states . . . in [sic] accordance with
certain principles’ that order relations between them.”22 Moreover,
19 See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in
NEW DIMENSIONS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 22 (Jaime de Melo & Arvind
Panagariya eds., 1993) (discussing the relative strengths and weaknesses of
regional versus multilateral trade strategies); Robert Z. Lawrence, Emerging
Regional Arrangements: Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?, in FINANCE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 22 (Richard O’Brien ed., 1991) (assessing the impact and
future implications of regional trade agreements in the context of the global push
towards multilateralism).
20
Royal Econ. Soc’y, Regionalism Versus Multilateralism: Will Preferential
Agreements Undermine the Global Trading System, http://www.res.org.uk/society
/mediabriefings/pdfs/1998/July/lahiri.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2011); Sajal
Lahiri, Controversy: Regionalism versus Multilateralism, 108 ECON. J. 1126, 1126 (1998).
21 L. Alan Winters, Regionalism versus Multilateralism 2–3 (The World Bank,
Policy Research Working Paper No. 1687, 1996), available at http://www.unige.ch
/ses/ecopo/demelo/Cdrom/RIA/Readings/Winters96.pdf.
22 See Caroline Bouchard & John Peterson, Conceptualising Multilateralism: Can
We All Just Get Along? 7 (Mercury, E-Paper No. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.mercury-fp7.net/fileadmin/user_upload/E_paper_no_1__Revised
_Version.pdf (quoting John Gerard Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an
Institution, 46 INT’L ORG. 561, 568 (1992)).
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they think multilateralism represents a generic institutional form
constructed on the basis of certain principles (generalized
principles of conduct, indivisibility, and diffuse reciprocity) that
differentiate it from other forms of international relations. 23
Particularly, trade multilateralism means, “application of the mostfavored-nation principle on a non-discriminatory basis.” 24
Accordingly, certain scholars characterize the “’[international] rule
of law’ as the single most important goal of the international
system, one upon which all other goals . . . depend.”25 However,
not every nation aspires to multilateralism.
For example,
unilateralists and regionalists stress the threat that multilateralism
poses to national autonomy and freedom of action.26 In contrast to
the multilateralism approach, regionalism is another option that is
available to countries. 27 Furthermore, there are a few different
ways in which regionalism can be achieved;28 entering into FTAs
and forming customs unions are the two most common tools.
23
Id. (describing how multilateralism differs from other forms of
international relations because multilateralism is built on generalized principles of
conduct, indivisibility, and diffuse reciprocity).
24 John Van Oudenaren, What is “Multilateral”?, 117 POL’Y REV. 33, 34 (2003).
25 See Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism, and the Architecture of
International Law, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 323, 331–32 (2008) (characterizing the
international rule of law as the preeminent goal of the international system from
which all other goals stem from); see also Zhao Jun & Han Xiaoan (赵骏和韩小安),
WTO Fazhi He Zhongguo Fazhi De Dili Yu Hudong (WTO 法治和中国法治的砥砺与
互 动 ) [Mutual Encouragement and Interactions between WTO Rule of Law and
China’s Rule of Law] , 41 ZHEJIANG DAXUE XUEBAO -RENWEN SHEHUI KEXUE BAN (浙
江大学学报—人文社会科学版) [J.ZHEJIANG U. (HUMAN. & SOC. SCI.)] 147, 149 (2011)
(characterizing the international rule of law as a reasonable reaction to
globalization and describing its influence on legislation, adjudication, and legal
implementation).
26 See Blum, supra note 25, at 325 (observing that a proponent of unilateralism
may view multilateralism as a threat where it imposes restraints on states’
conduct or transfers decision-making power to international governance).
27 See generally C. O’Neal Taylor, Regionalism: The Second-Best Option?, 28 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 155 (2008) (examining whether regionalism meets the
expectations, needs and capabilities of developing countries and how this option
could be improved to address development issues).
28 See OECD, REGIONALISM AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM (2003),
available at http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/OECD_RTAs_book_jul03.pdf
(studying different approaches to regionalism and their relationship to the
multilateral trading system). In fact, the trend that countries use regional trade
agreements to counter any unreasonable acts, requests and practices of their
trading partners by including internal measures in FTAs that are not usually
covered in international treaties, is called “aggressive regionalism.” The Korea-
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An FTA is a negotiated agreement between two or more
countries or economic entities under which they agree to lower
tariffs, as well as reduce non-tariff barriers, on goods imported
from the other member(s). FTAs constitute a major departure from
the most-favored-nation obligation of WTO members, which
requires that all members apply the same tariffs to all other
countries’ products.29 Because they lower tariffs, FTAs contribute
to trade liberalization. Unlike customs unions, members of FTAs
maintain their own tariff policies when trading with non-members.
To ensure protection of these preferences and prevent exploiting
the low tariff rate between FTA members by third parties, FTAs
establish “rules of origin”30 to identify which products are eligible
for favorable tariff treatment, and prevent third parties from
shipping through a lower-tariff member to a higher-tariff
member.31

U.S. FTA offers a typical example. See Won-Mog Choi, Aggressive Regionalism in
Korea-U.S. FTA: The Present and Future of Korea’s FTA Policy, 12 J. INT’L ECON. L.
595, 597–603 (2009) (discussing the major problems in Korea-U.S. trade and their
resolution in the Korea-U.S. FTA).
29 See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 160–62 (2d ed. 1997) (stating that mostfavored-nation is an obligation to treat activities of a particular foreign country or
its citizens at least as favorably as it treats the activities of any other country). The
GATT Article XXIV MFN exception for trade groupings applies to three types of
associations: a free trade area (defined in Article XXIV, paragraph 8(b)), a customs
union (defined in Article XXIV, paragraph 8(a)), and an interim agreement
leading to one of the above within a reasonable period of time.
30 Rules of origin are the criteria needed to determine the national source of a
product. See Won-Mog Choi, Defragmenting Fragmented Rules of Origin of RTAs: A
Building Block to Global Free Trade, 13 J. INT’L ECON. L. 111 (2010) (discussing rules
of origin within the context of fragmented regional trade agreements); John Coyle,
Rules of Origin as Instruments of Foreign Economic Policy: An Analysis of the Integrated
Sourcing Initiative in the U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 545,
546 (2004) (borrowing ideas from political science literature and offering a
detailed discussion of “rules of origin” as “necessary components of all bilateral
free trade agreements”); Masahiro Kawai & Ganeshan Wignaraja, Free Trade
Agreements in East Asia: A Way toward Trade Liberalization?, ADB BRIEFS, No. 1, June
2010, at 5 (observing how rules of origin raise transaction and administrative costs
in the context of FTAs).
31 See Moshe Hirsch, Rules of Origin as Trade or Foreign Policy Instruments? The
European Union Policy on Products Manufactured in the Settlements in the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 572, 572–73 (2003) (describing the aim of
rules of origin in determining whether a particular preferential arrangement will
be applied to a given product in international trade); Mohammad F. Nsour,
Regional Trade Agreements in the Era of Globalization: A Legal Analysis, 33 N.C. J.
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Countries sign trade agreements for various reasons. 32
Entering into FTAs can underpin strategic alliances, contributing to
security arrangements.33 Smaller countries can also benefit from
access to larger markets by signing FTAs with larger countries.
Furthermore, FTAs can help bolster exports and secure domestic
reforms for economic development, which in turn expedites
broader multilateral accords.34 From a tactical perspective, signing
FTAs might help spur broader integration of the member states’
economies, political systems, militaries, and so on.35
There are a few global issues that we need to bear in mind in
analyzing free trade agreements. First, in analyzing the respective
comparative advantage of multilateralism and regionalism, we
need to understand that achieving the overall welfare of
international society might not necessarily overlap with an
individual country’s objectives. Second, global problems do not
necessarily need global solutions.36

INT’L L. & COM. REG. 359, 370 (2008) (differentiating between two kinds of rules of
origins).
32 See John Whalley, Why Do Countries Seek Regional Trade Agreements?, in THE
REGIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 63, 64 (Jeffrey A. Frankel ed., 1998)
(assessing the various impetuses, forces, and influences that lead countries to
enter regional trade agreements, with a more general focus on the benefits and
drawbacks of a regional trade policies).
33 The European Union and ASEAN agreements are good examples of this
“spillover” effect.
34 See Jeffrey J. Schott, Assessing US FTA Policy, in FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS:
US STRATEGIES & PRIORITIES 359, 363 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004), available at
http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/chapters_preview/375/13iie361
6.pdf (examining U.S. FTA trading policies, with a focus on how FTAs benefit the
United States and with recommendations regarding future U.S. FTA partners and
agreements).
35
The EU would be the paradigmatic case of this multidisciplinary
integration. What began as an effort to link the steel and coal communities of six
western European countries has grown to be an enormous supranational body
comprising of 27 states connected by agreements in economic, social, regulatory,
financial, labor, and other fields.
See What Does the EU Do?, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/abc/12lessons/lesson_5/index_en.htm (last visited Sept. 20,
2011) (describing the EU’s integration in various policy areas).
36 See, e.g., Robert Howse, The End of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay,
121 HARV. L. REV. 1528 (2008) (commenting on how countries have strategically
adapted to globalization); Blum, supra note 25, 323–26 (observing that the
preference for multilateralism is often not based on an informed choice).
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2.1. Economic Rationality
Economists analyze trade liberalization by considering both
short and long-term effects, as well as weighing the social and
private costs of adjustment. Long-term effects are most important
for successful free trade agreements. The most important longterm gains include increased competition, stimulus to investment
and more efficient use of economic resources. 37 The short-term
effects of creating a free trade agreement are measured in terms of
trade creation and trade diversion.38
Jacob Viner initiated the evaluation of preferential trade
agreements by assessing the trade creation and trade diversion
effects.39 Trade creation occurs when lower-cost imports from one
trading partner replace domestic production in another. Trade
creation leads to efficiency gains for each country because each
country will shift from a higher-cost domestic source product to a
lower-cost foreign product. Each country will eventually begin to
specialize in producing those items in which they have a
comparative advantage. On the other hand, trade diversion occurs
when lower-cost imports from a non-member country are
prevented from entering a member country because of tariffs or
37 See APEC STUDY CENTRE—MONASH UNIVERSITY, AN AUSTRALIA-USA FREE
TRADE
AGREEMENT:
ISSUES
AND
IMPLICATIONS
(2001),
available
at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/aus_us_fta_mon/ (analyzing the impact
of an FTA with the US on Australia); Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 30, at 4–5
(stating that FTAs tend to have a net positive benefit).
38 See generally BÉLA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (1961)
(analyzing the problems of economic integration among sovereign nations and
presenting a unified theory of economic integration that addresses some of these
inherent issues); WILLIAM H. COOPER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31356, FREE TRADE
AGREEMENTS: IMPACT ON U.S. TRADE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. TRADE POLICY
(2011), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL31356.pdf (describing
the U.S. implications of FTAs); Richard G. Lipsey, The Theory Of Customs Unions:
Trade Diversion And Welfare, 24 ECONOMICA 40 (1957) (discussing the welfare
distributions that result from customs unions); J.E. MEADE, THE THEORY OF
CUSTOMS UNIONS (1955) (assessing whether, and how, the removal of trade
barriers, via agreements like customs unions, leads to more economic use of
global resources); JAROSLAV VANEK, GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM OF INTERNATIONAL
DISCRIMINATION: THE CASE OF CUSTOMS UNIONS (1965) (analyzing the global effects
of regional trade agreements, with a focus on the impact of customs unions on the
world economy); JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (1950) (examining the
concept, intent, and mode of operation of customs unions in general, from an
economic point of view).
39 See VINER, supra note 38, at 5–6 (analyzing the economic impact of trade
principles applied on customs unions).
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non-tariff barriers. While not banned from entering in the strict
sense, they are instead replaced by higher-cost imports from a FTA
partner country.40
While this basic binary explained the effects that entering into
FTAs might cause, scholars have introduced a wide variety of
critiques. For example, this basic binary is static in nature, and
ignores such factors as economies of scale, spill-over effects, and
improved investment climates. 41 In addition, economics cannot
fully account for the logic behind FTAs. By including political
concerns in the discussion, debates focus on the question of
whether FTAs represent “stumbling blocks” or “building blocks”42
to accomplishing the broader goals of the global trading
community.43
Support for FTAs stems from the belief that they act as a
building block to multilateral trade liberalization. 44 Instead of
breaking up global trade into protectionist blocs, FTAs can assist in
furthering the cause of multilateral trade negotiations, 45 and
stimulate growth within the area. Regional arrangements such as
FTAs lead to increased demand for extra-regional goods due to
increased investment. 46 Furthermore, FTAs facilitate deeper

40 See APEC STUDY CENTRE—MONASH UNIVERSITY, supra note 37, at 6 (noting
that some countries, such as Australia, would reap wide-ranging benefits from
access to larger economies through trade).
41 See Jason R. Wolff, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Assessing Opportunities
for Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean, 20 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 103, 105 (1996) (outlining the strengths and weaknesses of regional
integration plans).
42 These terminologies are elegantly popularized by Robert Lawrence. See
Lawrence, supra note 19.
43 See Sungjoon
Cho, Breaking the Barrier between Regionalism and
Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 419, 430–
34 (2001) (discussing the weaknesses inherent in trade agreements that lead to
inequalities and inefficiencies in regional trade agreements and outlining potential
legal and economic solutions to this growing problem).
44 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD
ECONOMIC SYSTEM 227 (1997) (suggesting that appropriately arranged FTAs are
“building blocks” for global liberalization).
45 See Michael Ewing-Chow, Southeast Asia and Free Trade Agreements: WTO
Plus or Bust?, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 193, 206 (2004) (concluding that FTAs have
facilitated new regional trade rules).
46 See Lawrence, supra note 19 (discussing how regional agreements help
boost regional economies, which in turn, carries future implications on the state of
multilateral trade).
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integration between the member states, which may, in turn,
facilitate integration with the rest of the world. Empirical research
substantiates this claim. 47 For example, the “gravity equation”
approach has been an empirical workhorse in international trade to
study the ex post effects of FTAs on trade flows.48
On the other hand, some oppose FTAs because they undermine
the development of the multilateral trading system. 49 Some
scholars strongly advocate that national governments should not
pursue FTAs at the expense of multilateral negotiations. 50 One
fervent multilateralist, Jagdish Bhagwati, points out the “spaghetti
bowl” problem of regional trade arrangement (including FTAs)
where various idiosyncratic preferential trade agreements,
complicated rules, and variable tariffs will increase unnecessary
costs and finally defeat the objective in reaching a clean tariff
regime under WTO.51 Moreover, as a result of trade diversion,

47 Scott L. Baier & Jeffery H. Bergstrand, Economic Determinants of Free Trade
Agreements, 64 J. INT’L ECON. 29, 30 (2004) (finding that “pure economic”
characteristics, such as distance between two countries, remoteness from the rest
of the world, and similarity in economic size, accurately predict eighty-five
percent of FTAs).
48 See, e.g., Tamim Bayoumi & Barry Eichengreen, Is Regionalism Simply a
Diversion? Evidence from the Evolution of the EC and EFTA, in REGIONALISM VS.
MULTILATERAL TRADE ARRANGEMENTS 141, 144–46 (Takatoshi Ito & Anne O.
Krueger eds., 1997) (describing the use of the gravity model to examine the effects
of FTAs on trade).
49 Rahul Sen & Sadhana Srivastava, ASEAN’s Bilateral Preferential Trade and
Economic Cooperation Agreements: Implications for Asian Economic Integration, 26
ASEAN ECON. BULL. 194, 212 (2009) (warning that improperly implemented FTAs
can create detrimental consequences for economic integration).
50 See generally JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WIND OF THE HUNDRED DAYS: HOW
WASHINGTON MISMANAGED GLOBALIZATION (2000) (criticizing U.S. policy,
particularly under President Clinton, of engaging in preferential trade
agreements); Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation with Free Trade
Areas, in THE DANGEROUS DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS 1 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Anne O. Krueger eds., 1995) (opposing the U.S. policy of entering into
FTAs instead of multilateral treaties); Jagdish Bhagwati, Preferential Trade
Agreements: The Wrong Road, 27 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 865 (1995) (arguing that
preferential trade agreements discriminate against nonmember parties and add
barriers to multilateral trade).
51 See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, TERMITES IN THE TRADING SYSTEM: HOW PREFERENTIAL
AGREEMENTS UNDERMINE FREE TRADE 61–71 (2008) (illustrating how crisscrossing
FTAs restrict trade generally).
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FTAs may create new interest groups whose economic survival
depends upon the maintenance of trade preferences.52
2.2. Political-Economic and Institutional Analysis
Regionalism is an enduring feature of the multilateral trading
regime and “a natural path of human civilization.” 53 Certain
scholars find “the preference for bilateralism or multilateralism in
international lawmaking is often determined not by an informed
choice but by an instinctive association of political schools or
bureaucratic affiliations with different forms of international
regulation.”54
With the development of institutional analysis, no bright line
exists between economic analysis and political analysis, as the
difference is only a matter of degree. Relatively speaking though,
political analysis tends to be a more values-driven discipline
whereas economic analysis strives to be values-neutral.55 Public
52 See David Quartner, Public Choice Theory, Protectionism and the Case of
NAFTA, 26 ECON. AFF. 59, 59 (2006) (suggesting that trade policy is especially
susceptible to special interest groups).
53 Cho, supra note 43, at 419 (proposing that regional alliances should be
formed in an effort to expand commercially and enhance both economic and
political integration).
54 Blum, supra note 25, at 323 (arguing that forming treaties solely based on
common ideologies can be detrimental to international goals). Accord Kyle
Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Domestic Policies, National Sovereignty, and
International Economic Institutions, 116 Q. J. ECON. 519, 522 (2001) (explaining the
inefficiencies introduced when policies determine market access); Robert C.
Feenstra & Tracy R. Lewis, Negotiated Trade Restrictions with Private Political
Pressure, 106 Q. J. ECON. 1287, 1287 (1991) (asserting that politics influence a
country’s trade policies).
55
Indeed, value judgments appear to be increasingly driving political
analysis, a shift which has been referred to as “normative political analysis.” See
generally Lewis A. Dexter, Political Processes and Judgments of Value, 40 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 294 (1946) (arguing that value-judgments are relevant to political analysis);
John Gerring & Joshua Yesnowitz, A Normative Turn in Political Science?, 38 POLITY
101 (2006) (discussing the shift in political science towards more normative
approaches which are less value-neutral). On the other hand, the discipline of
economics purports to be value-free, particularly with respect to individual
economists’ personal inclinations. See Murray N. Rothbard, Value Implications of
Economic Theory, 17 AM. ECONOMIST 35, 35 (1973) (opining that the science of
economic theory should “purge itself of all vestiges of the unsupported value
judgment”); Israel M. Kirzner, The Anatomy of Economic Advice: Part I, FREEMAN,
July/Aug. 2006, at 28, 30–33 (discussing the view that economists should be
objective and detached from their personal values when conducting economic
analyses).
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choice theory could be regarded as a tradeoff between political
institutions and legal institutions.56 “Public choice theory suggests
that the political process has an in-built tendency to promote
protectionist measures favoured by organised interest groups
rather than trade liberalisation that would benefit society as a
whole.”57
Moreover, certain scholars have used a political economy
framework to analyze the viability of FTAs between countries—as
well as the desired form that they will take—by emphasizing the
interaction between industry special interest groups and political
institutions.58
3.

CHINA’S GLOBALIZATION

China’s recent FTAs must first be situated within its rising
influence in regional and global affairs. The boom began along
mainland China’s border: Hong Kong, Macau, ASEAN, and
Pakistan. It now spans both coasts of the Asia-Pacific: New
Zealand, Chile, Singapore, and Costa Rica. To understand China’s
FTA partnerships, we must understand how China has engaged its
neighbors over the past two decades. China’s diplomatic efforts to
cultivate good relations with its neighbors are indivisible from its
present strategy of entering FTAs with them.59 After discussing
56 See Peter L. Kahn, The Politics of Unregulation: Public Choice and Limits on
Government, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 280, 312 (1990) (advocating the use of safeguards
to combat the influence of public interest groups on government regulation); Paul
B. Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory and International
Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 745, 745 (1995) (positing that public
choice theory is a useful tool for explaining the effect of economics on
lawmaking). See generally ALAN PEACOCK, PUBLIC CHOICE ANALYSIS IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE (1992) (emphasizing the influence of the political process on
government expenditure). But see generally Cynthia R. Farina & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State: Foreword:
Post-Public Choice?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 267 (2002) (surveying recent scholars’
varied theories on the pros and cons of public choice).
57 Quartner, supra note 52, at 59.
58 See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, The Politics of Free-Trade
Agreements, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 667, 668 (1995) (propounding a model in which a
nation’s trade agreements are a direct result of the relative influence of its special
interest groups).
59 The notion that free trade agreements, whether bilateral or multilateral,
distort international trade has been a key tenet of international economics for
much of the past century. But it is also clear that countries sign FTAs for reasons
unrelated to economics, such as for political goodwill, security arrangements
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China’s regionalization strategy, we take up its preferences for
bilateral relationships. This sets the stage for discussing the
narrow question of how China selects its FTA partners.
3.1. Dense Institutionalization
We have used the term “dense institutionalism” to describe
China’s recent engagement with its neighbors.60 More specifically,
dense institutionalism refers to China’s policy of increased
interaction with neighboring countries by actively participating in
regional organizations, as well as establishing new ones. This
section highlights the important changes in China’s foreign policy,
beginning in the early 1990s, when China took its first steps toward
regional integration by joining regional bodies such as ASEAN and
APEC. By the end of the 1990s, China took a more extroverted
stance towards its immediate neighbors in Southeast, East, and
Central Asia, and the Asia Pacific region more generally, by more
actively engaging regional bodies, as well as establishing its own
regional body, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).
After joining the WTO in 2001, China’s integration policy had
important spillover effects; relationships built on political and
security concerns—such as those with ASEAN and SCO—
gradually gave way to economic agreements covering trade,
investment, and services. Presently, all of China’s FTA partners
are either bordering countries or members of regional institutions
in which China participated during the past two decades.
In the 1980s, China was still relatively inward looking. Deng
Xiaoping cautioned that China should not seek leadership (buyao
dangtou) and repeatedly warned the Chinese political
establishment against playing a role in regional or international
affairs. 61 ASEAN led a campaign to engage China, instead of

(U.S.-Israel FTA), or larger political goals (such as the creation of a modern
supranational organization in the form of the EU). The fundamental issue of free
trade agreements, as Paul Krugman put it, is “a question of political economy
rather than of economics proper.” See Paul Krugman, The Move Towards Free Trade
Zones, 76 ECON. REV. 5, 14–15 (1991) (arguing that regional FTAs tend to
undermine the interests of the international trading world as a whole).
60 See Webster, supra note 18, at 440 (describing China’s recent integration
with countries in the region’s various regional organizations).
61 See DENG XIAOPING (邓小平), DENG XIAOPING WENXUAN DISANJUAN (邓小平
文选-第三卷) [SELECTED WORKS OF DENG XIAOPING] 321 (1993) (advising that China
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ostracizing it. 62 Leaders in Beijing reacted warmly and joined
ASEAN, first as a guest in 1991, then as a consultative partner to
the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, and finally as a member of
the ASEAN + 1 framework in 1997. 63 During the Asian Financial
Crisis of 1997, China earned additional goodwill from Southeast
Asia by not devaluing its currency, despite pressure to do so. 64
Since that time, China has signed several treaties and other
diplomatic documents on security, diplomacy, and territorial
matters with ASEAN65, creating a bedrock of goodwill upon which
to build closer economic relationships. In 2000, Zhu Rongji’s
proposal to explore further cooperation in free trade with ASEAN
further built upon the diplomatic efforts of the previous decade.66
In 2010, the trade-in-goods portion of the FTA went into effect.67
maintain the political and economic positions which pervaded there during the
1980s).
62 See David Shambaugh, Return to the Middle Kingdom?: China and Asia in the
Early Twenty-First Century, in POWER SHIFT 23, 27 (David Shambaugh ed., 2005)
(describing China’s shift from suspicion to support for multilateral trade
organizations).
63 See Lee Lai To, China’s Relations with ASEAN: Partners in the 21st Century?,
13 PACIFICA REV. 61, 64–65 (2001) (outlining China’s gradual progression towards
engagement with ASEAN).
64 See Pro-Active Policies by China in Response to Asian Financial Crisis, MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFF. OF CHINA (Nov. 17, 2000), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng
/ziliao/3602/3604/t18037.htm (detailing the actions China took during the 1997
financial crisis that helped stabilize the region’s economy).
65 See e.g., Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field
of Non-Traditional Security Issues, ASEAN-China Documents Series 1991–2005, at
60 (Nov. 4, 2002), available at http://www.asean.org/13185.htm (establishing an
agreement between China and the ASEAN countries to jointly combat terrorism
and other security threats); Memorandum of Understanding Between The
Governments of the Member Countries of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the Government of the People’s Republic of China On
Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues (Jan. 10, 2004), available
at http://www.asean.org/15647.htm (introducing a specific security agenda
pursuant to the Joint Declaration).
66 See See Wang Xiangjiang, Si Jiuyue & Zhu Changdu (王湘江、司久岳和朱
昌都), Zhu Rongji Chuxi Zhongguo Dongmeng Lingdaoren Huiwu (朱镕基出席中国—
东盟领导人会晤) [Zhu Rongji Attended the Meeting of the Leaders from China and
ASEAN], GUANGMING RIBAO ( 光 明 日 报 ) [GUANGMING DAILY], Nov. 26, 2000,
http://www.gmw.cn/01gmrb/2000-11/26/GB/11%5E18616%5E0%5EGMA1207.htm (outlining Premier Zhu’s plan for continued economic cooperation in the
region).
67 See China-ASEAN Free Trade Area Starts Operation, CHINA VIEW (Jan. 1, 2010,
1:13:26
PM),
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/01/content
_12739017.htm (announcing the start of the China-ASEAN free trade zone).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss1/2

02 ZHAO WEBSTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

10/31/2011 7:34 PM

CHINA’S FIRST DECADE OF FREE TRADE

81

China has also reached out to its regional neighbors through
membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), an
intergovernmental consultative body aimed at promoting
intraregional trade and investment. 68 Though APEC has not
instituted formally binding measures to lower tariffs or other trade
barriers, it has provided the major and minor powers of the Pacific
Rim a forum to discuss international economic issues outside of
bilateral exchanges. China’s participation in APEC not only
burnished its regional image, 69 but also promoted linkages with
countries beyond its immediate borders. China thickened ties to
current FTA partners like New Zealand, Chile, and Peru, and
potential FTA partners like Mexico through these meetings.
In 1996, China made its strongest commitment to regional
multilateralism by establishing, with four other countries, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). SCO initially aimed to
ease military tension among China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan through confidence-building measures
and force reductions along the border. 70 Since then, China has
played a leading role in the organization by setting up and
underwriting a permanent secretariat in Beijing. 71 China is also
pushing the agenda from its traditional focus on security towards
economic cooperation, improving the investment environment,

68 See About APEC, ASIA-PACIFIC ECON. COOP., http://www.apec.org/AboutUs/About-APEC.aspx (last visited Sept. 20, 2011) (explaining that the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation is a multi-national group, the purpose of which is to
promote trade, growth, and economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region).
69 Yahuda, supra note 9, at 110 (“Membership of APEC has also helped
China’s leaders to promote their country’s image as a responsible member of the
region.”).
70 David Shambaugh, China’s Military Views the World: Ambivalent Security, 29
INT’L SEC 52, 72 (2000) (explaining that China and Russia have demilitarized their
border region and taken other measures to increase their mutual security, and that
China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan agreed to reduce their
military forces in the region by signing agreement).
71 Julie Boland, Ten Years of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Lost
Decade? A Partner for the U.S.?, 21ST CENTURY DEFENSE INITIATIVE AT BROOKINGS 8
(Jun. 20, 2011) http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/files/rc/papers/2011/06
_shanghai_cooperation_organization_boland/06_shanghai_cooperation_organiza
tion_boland.pdf (“The SCO’s basic bureaucratic structure consists of two
standing bodies: the Secretariat based in Beijing and overseen by a Secretary
General who serves a three-year term, and the Regional Anti Terror Structure
(RATS) with a staff based in Tashkent.”).
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and reducing nontariff barriers.72 In addition, Premier Wen Jiabao
proposed a free trade area,73 though such an agreement has yet to
materialize. Still, as in ASEAN, SCO has moved from an
organization concerned mostly with security and politics into one
that actively promotes economic cooperation. While SCO has yet
to lead to an FTA, the organization itself reveals China’s
aspirations to be a regional leader in the fields of politics,
diplomacy, security, and economics. Its incremental approach to
building relationships—first tackling matters of common concern
before approaching higher levels of interactivity, and recent
pursuit of economic interests—speaks to China’s regional
aspirations.
3.2. Bilateral or Multilateral?
It is worth mentioning a few preliminary issues before diving
into China’s preference for bilateralism. First, as is well known,
multilateral trade negotiations under the WTO are making little
progress, such that no feasible alternatives to regionalism or
bilateralism have emerged. The bilateral approach has been
adopted by many major trading powers, including the United
States and the EU. 74 The adoption of bilateralism is thus not
particular to China.
Second, China is also responding to other countries’ efforts to
sign FTAs, what we might call the “peer pressure” theory of FTAs.
72 See SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORG., JOINT COMMUNIQUÉ OF THE COUNCIL OF
THE GOVERNMENTAL HEADS (PRIME MINISTERS) OF SHANGHAI COOPERATION
ORGANIZATION MEMBER STATES, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Sept. 23, 2004), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng

/wjdt/2649/t162437.htm (approving an “outline on the multi-lateral economic
and trade cooperation among the member states of Shanghai Cooperation
Organization" by addressing economic, cultural, and technological cooperation
among members states).
73 See Chris Devonshire-Ellis, The Shanghai Cooperation Organizations Growing
Trade Influence, 2POINT6BILLION.COM, Nov. 10, 2010, http://www.2point6billion
.com/news/2010/11/10/the-shanghai-cooperation-organizations-growing-tradeinfluence-7957.html (explaining that Wen Jiabao proposed a long-term goal of
establishing a free trade area in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization at a 2003
SCO member meeting).
74 See, e.g., Sungjoon Cho, Defragmenting World Trade, 27 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS.
39, 43 (2006) (“[T]he United States and the European Union are reenacting their
interwar mercantile rivalry by rushing to form preferential blocs (European Union
and Free Trade Agreement of the Americas), rather than pursuing multilateral
trade liberalization.”).
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If everyone else is signing FTAs and China is not, its exports and
investments correspondingly suffer. 75 China certainly does not
want to be left out of the economic integration through regional
arrangements. Signing FTAs ensures a level playing field between
China and other large economies like the United States and Japan.
Third, multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties are both
necessary components of the international law infrastructure, 76
even as they promote different goals.77 In reality, a global solution
might not be the best solution for certain global issues. Indeed,
China’s policymakers seem to agree on this point in their pursuit of
the bilateral approach (evinced in the FTA boom) and multilateral
approach (evident in China’s WTO negotiations and rule-making
process) as complements to one another.78
In the debate between multilateralists and bilateralists, China,
like other countries, is aiming to maximize its welfare while
observing international obligations. China has struck a middle
ground of combining multilateral and bilateral approaches.
Membership in various international organizations enhances
China’s power and status, but also gives China the opportunity to
demonstrate that it will honor its commitments and actively
participate in the making of new international rules.79 On the other
75 By way of example, like many other countries, South Korea is in a dilemma:
on one hand, it wants to sign an FTA with China urging the liberalization of
China’s markets. On the other hand, it needs to protect its agricultural products
at home.
76
See supra Section 3.1. (providing a detailed discussion about
multilateralism versus regionalism); see also Blum, supra note 25, at 333 (arguing
that while laws often need to be multilateral in nature in order to establish a
transnational society, the numerous rules governing and complicating the making
of treaties sometimes make bilateral treaties a more practical alternative).
77 See supra Section 3.1 (detailing China’s developing relationship with both
regional and international powers in the last century).
78 See Buzhang Fangtan: Yi Xiaozhun Buzhang Tan Zhongguo zai Quyu Jingji
Hezuo Daqushi xiade Jueze yu Zuowei (部长访谈：易小准副部长谈中国在区域经济合
作 大 趋 势 下 的 抉 择 与 作 为 ) [Interview with Minister: Vice Minister Yi Xiaozhun
Discussed China’s Choice and Performance against the Backdrop of Regional Economic
Cooperation], MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF CHINA (May 5, 2007, 5:26 PM) [hereinafter
Interview with Vice Minister Yi Xiaozhun], http://yixiaozhun.mofcom.gov.cn
/aarticle/speeches/200705/20070504725234.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2011)
(explaining that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other cooperation
mechanisms have strengthened Central Asia’s cohesion).
79 Qingjiang Kong, China’s WTO Accession and the ASEAN-China Free Trade
Area: the Perspective of a Chinese Lawyer, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 839, 843, 846 (2004)
(arguing that by forming the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA),
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hand, for various economic and political reasons, China has
actively sought out bilateral FTAs.
Nevertheless, it is clear that China prefers bilateralism, which
offers many advantages vis-à-vis multilateralism.80 While scholars
have generated a laundry list of generic characteristics of
bilateralism,81 only some reflect China’s particular circumstances
and preferences.
First, bilateralism allows governments to conclude the types of
agreements in a manner that most closely aligns with their and
their partner’s interests.82 In other words, it is better tailored to
meet the specific needs of the present relationship, and influence
future relations by making strategic decisions about which goods
to liberalize, which services to protect, and so on. The bilateral
approach allows more flexibility, creativity, political expediency,
and ownership over the provisions. This is generally applicable for
China. As revealed previously, in choosing FTA partners, China
tends to choose partner countries that are resource rich, but not
superpowers. Obviously, China will not have this luxury in WTO
negotiations.
Moreover, areas not covered by the multilateral treaties or
commitments may be included in FTAs. For instance, the FTA
with New Zealand covers movement of people, allowing New
Zealand to send business people to China and China to dispatch
China will increase its available resources and market volume, allowing it to
develop into an economic super-power, and that the formation of the ACFTA will
allow China and ASEAN to work together to form international economic rules).
80 See Arie Reich, Bilateralism versus Multilateralism in International Economic
Law: Applying the Principle of Subsidiarity, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 263, 287 (2010)
(stating that “[b]ilateral and regional agreements have many advantages that are
forgone within the multilateral system,” like sensitivity to interest of states,
reciprocity without free-riding, ease of negotiation, quicker response to
technological change, and efficiency in signaling); Cf. Paul Krugman, Is
Bilateralism Bad? 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2972, 1989)
http://time.dufe.edu.cn/spti/article/krugman/krugman022.pdf (positing that
while global welfare will likely decline in the presence of many bilateral
agreements, individual countries involved in a customs union may benefit if the
customs union reduces its external tariff to a level that will not result in trade
diversion).
81 See Reich, supra note 80 at 286 (highlighting recent inclusions in bilateral
agreements including investment protection and side agreements regarding labor
and environmental standards).
82 See generally Taylor, supra note 27 (arguing that bilateralism allows greater
flexibility with regard to the design and content of the regional agreement).
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skilled workers to New Zealand in areas where shortages exist.83
In addition, the China-New Zealand FTA contains enhanced
investment protection provisions.84 Furthermore, China will also
have more control over the timing of the negotiation. A
multilateral treaty could not possibly allow China such
opportunities and protections. Most importantly, as a major carveout of most-favored nation (MFN) principle, without concern for
giving the same preferential treatment to all members, China might
venture somewhat further in terms of opening its market to FTA
partners. In summary, bilateralism can give the countries more
room to customize the arrangements to the specific needs and
circumstances of particular relationships.85
In addition, reciprocity is possible only in bilateral deals.
Under the MFN principle, China must extend to all WTO members
the best trading privileges granted to any one member and must
treat goods of an importing WTO member’s trading partners on
equal terms with one another.86 It will clearly be a losing deal for
China if China extends to each WTO member a tariff reduction
concession equal to those in China’s FTAs if those WTO members
83 See N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, NEW ZEALAND-CHINA
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: NATIONAL INTEREST ANALYSIS 33–34 (2008), available at
http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/3-Publications/Nationalinterest-analysis.pdf (explaining that the Movement of Natural Persons chapter of
the Agreement provides for “temporary entry,” which allows service providers
from one signatory nation to temporarily enter the other country to provide
services, and “temporary employment entry,” which allows citizens of one party
to temporarily enter the labor market of the other country).
84 In addition to the provisions on national treatment and most-favorednation treatment, the FTA provides for additional protections for New Zealand’s
investments in China beyond those available under prior agreements, including
protection from unjustified expropriation, provisions to allow the free transfer of
investment funds, and the incorporation of minimum international law standards
of fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security. See generally id.
85 See Blum, supra note 25, at 339.

This lack of uniformity allows BLTs greater room for creativity,
flexibility, and political expediency. A tailored arrangement also endows
its authors and their subjects with a sense of ownership over its
provisions, thereby increasing their propensity to comply.
The
uniformity of MLTs is thus traded for the individual fit of BLTs.
Id.
86 See Peter K. Yu et al., China and the WTO: Progress, Perils, and Prospects, 17
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 21–22 (2003) (describing the steps that China has taken to
ensure that its laws and practices are consistent with its WTO obligations and the
MFN principle).
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are not obligated to extend reciprocal concessions. In fact, this is
precisely the “free-riding” problem that concerns scholars and
critics of bilateral agreements.87
Logistically, bilateral agreements are easier to conclude. The
failure to launch a new round of trade negotiation in Seattle, the
collapse of the Cancun negotiations, and the uncertainties in the
Doha round negotiation88 have generated tremendous unease and
distrust among states and led some to question the practicability of
multilateralism generally. By contrast, bilateral agreements are
certainly easier to conclude; only two parties need reach agreement,
not 153 as in the WTO. However, certain scholars caution against
confusing the efficiency of the negotiation process with the
efficiency of its outcome, simply because an efficient negotiation
process does not necessarily produce an efficient outcome.
Reaching an efficient outcome might require lengthy and uneasy
negotiations.89 Multilateral negotiation cycles are getting longer.90
International investment law well exemplifies the expediency of
the bilateral approach. The failure of the international community
to form a multilateral investment agreement suggests the difficulty
of arriving at mutually agreeable multilateral treaties. In its
absence, bilateral investment treaties have proliferated and become
their own corpus of international law.91

87 See, e.g., Rodney D. Ludema & Anna Maria Mayda, Do Countries Free Ride
on MFN?, 77 J. INT’L ECON. 137, 137 (2009) (examining whether the MFN creates a
free-rider problem in multilateral trade negotiations by modeling multilateral
negotiations as a mechanism design problem with voluntary participation); JOHN
H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC RELATIONS 137–38 (1997) (noting that if a general MFN obligation
required all code nations to grant the favorable code treatment to nations who did
not become code members, these nations could take a “free-rider” approach).
88 See Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Doha’s Promises: Administrative Barriers as an
Obstruction to Development, 25 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 395 (2007) (positing that the
Doha round did not address many non-tariff, non-subsidy trade barriers and that
these obstacles limit developing countries’ exports).
89 See Blum, supra note 25, at 352 (arguing that the ability of parties to
manipulate the design of the regime without accepting its proscriptions leads to
inefficient and ineffective outcomes, thereby diminishing the ability of MLTs to
overcome collective action problems).
90 See Reich, supra note 80, at 277–78 (stating that multilateral rulemaking is
incapable of responding to the needs of the modern international economy,
thereby lengthening multilateral negotiation cycles).
91 See, e.g., Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De
Facto Multilateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303 (2009) (demonstrating how

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol33/iss1/2

02 ZHAO WEBSTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

10/31/2011 7:34 PM

CHINA’S FIRST DECADE OF FREE TRADE

87

Signing an FTA can, for certain countries, also have a signaling
effect—that they are interested in attracting foreign investment by
improving their legal infrastructure.92 Some argue that there might
be a “race to the bottom” when all the least developed countries
are signing bilateral treaties in order to attract foreign capital. At
this point, however, China does not sign FTAs to attract
investment, for it has attracted foreign direct investment since the
1980s.93
Bilateralism can also promote political and strategic objectives.
For example, the FTA with ASEAN to some extent improves the
friendship between China and ASEAN. 94 Moreover, China can
build its regional leader image by its artful FTA strategy. Japan
certainly has felt the pressure—with the implementation of
ASEAN-China FTA, 95 there is a growing fear in Japan that ASEAN
countries will gradually become China’s backyard.96
the network of bilateral investment treaties is gradually becoming a humanized
multilateral agreement).
92 See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them:
Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639 (1998)
(stating that an LDC can gain a competitive advantage in attracting investments
by signing bilateral treaties and thus demonstrating a willingness to sign such
agreements despite the harm they may cause to LDCs as a whole).
93
See, e.g., Cai Congyan, China-US BIT Negotiations and the Future of
Investment Treaty Regime: A Grand Bilateral Bargain with Multilateral Implications, 12
J. INT’L ECON. L. 457, 490–91 (2009) (arguing that China is not overly concerned
with the creation of a U.S.-China BIT because China is already attracting foreign
investment through other national factors).
94 See Qingjiang Kong, China’s WTO Accession and the ASEAN—China Free
Trade Area: The Perspective of a Chinese Lawyer, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 839 (2004)
(supporting the proposition that free trade agreements bring China and its
Southeast Asian neighbors closer than ever before); see also Jiangyu Wang, China’s
Regional Trade Agreements: The Law, Geopolitics, and Impact on the Multilateral
Trading System, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 119 (2004) (examining China’s recent trend in
negotiating and signing regional trade agreements); Jeremy Leong, Singapore:
Review of Major Policy Statements, 11 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 277, 296–97 (2007)
(discussing relations between China and ASEAN); Li Gensheng & Yue Wei (李根
生和岳伟), Zhongguo – Dongmeng Ziyou Maoyiqu Shishi Xiaoguo Fenxi (中国－东盟
自由贸易区实施效果分析 ) [Analysis of the Effect of the Implementation of ChinaASEAN Free Trade Zone], 387 HEZUO JINGJI YU KEJI (合作经济与科技) [CO-OPERATIVE
ECONOMY AND SCIENCE] (China) 94, 96 (2010) (demonstrating that the
establishment of ASEAN and the implementation of the Early Harvest Program
and of the Agreement on Commodity Trade have significantly improved bilateral
trade between China and ASEAN).
95 Cf. Jiangyu Wang, Association of Southeast Asian Nations-China Free Trade
Agreements, in BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES (Simon
Lester & Bryan Mecurio eds., 2009) (stating that given the non-existence of an
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Under certain circumstances, bilateral and regional
arrangements can also shift export markets and circumvent nontariff barriers. In fact, Vice Minister of Ministry of Commerce, Mr.
Yi Xiaozhun has explicitly expressed in his speech at the ChinaNew Zealand FTA Workshop that “[t]he Chinese government
adheres to free trade, keeps market open and opposes trade
protectionism.”97 Since the international financial crisis, a number
of countries, including the United States, have engaged in
protectionism by attaching anti-dumping measures to foreign
(especially Chinese) imports. 98 The China-ASEAN FTA, under
which China and ASEAN member states imposed zero tariffs on
over ninety percent of their products, will facilitate bilateral trade
among the countries under the framework.
Moreover, the
industrial investment cooperation measures under the FTA will
obviously facilitate China’s overseas investment in the ASEAN
member states, which is a pragmatic way to shift the export
markets and circumvent the confrontational trade barriers.
Of course, bilateralism need not diametrically oppose
multilateralism, and they are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Instead, they can be complementary forces. Multilateral rules or
arrangements may constitute a foundation that provides a basic
and overarching infrastructure for future development, while
bilateral agreements could attend to detailed rules for effective

international legal personality in ASEAN, as well as participation in the FTA by
individual countries as sovereign States, the FTA is actually a regional agreement
with eleven parties)
96
See The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Who’s Happy, Who’s Not,
KNOWLEDGE
@
WHARTON
(May
12,
2010),
http://www.knowledgeatwharton.com.cn/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&articleID=
2227&languageid=1 (describing Japan’s concerns regarding China’s increasing
importance in world trade and Japan’s interest in bringing the ASEAN countries
into its political sphere).
97
Vice Minister Yi Xiaozuhn, Speech at the China-New Zealand FTA
Workshop (July 29, 2010), http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enrelease/201007
/3094_1.html.
98 See Chinese Tires Targeted for Anti-Dumping Duties, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008,
http://articles.latimes.com/2008/feb/07/business/fi-tires7 (relating how the
WTO found for the United States in a complaint brought by China); Juliane von
Reppert-Bismarck, China Challenges WTO Ruling on U.S. Tire Tariffs, REUTERS, May
24, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/us-trade-wtotires-idUSTRE74N23320110524 (describing China’s plan to appeal the WTO ruling
against it for tire dumping).
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implementation.99 However, this complementary dynamic might
not always occur. Rather, multilateral treaties and bilateral treaties
may sometimes hinder each other. Parties always need a strong
reason to sign an additional bilateral treaty where they have
committed to a multilateral treaty previously and vice versa. 100
Moreover, signing parties must think carefully about the
compatibility of the arrangements when doing so sequentially.
However, China does not seem to adopt this strategy by taking
advantage of the sequential interactive dynamics between the
multilateral approach and the bilateral approach. Instead, China
adopted the dual-approach, pursuing multilateral and bilateral
agreements simultaneously, aiming to solve different issues.
Lastly, bilateral arrangements can serve an experimental
function. FTAs can help Chinese companies experience trade
liberalization on a small scale and learn to adapt to the wider-scale
as multilateralism progresses.101
4.

CHOOSING FTA PARTNERS

How does China choose its FTA partners? This is a tough
question to answer, and one that few experts could predict with
any certainty. Approaching the question of how China’s selection
process works requires some tentativeness and modesty.
Since China has not publicly articulated its FTA strategy nor its
selection criteria for FTA partners, other methods of investigation
are needed. One way to approach the issue is through comparison,
by looking at other countries’ trade policies. When mapping out
its trade strategy, China grappled with two possible models: that
of Japan and of the United States.102 Japan emphasized investment
99 See Blum, supra note 25, at 371 (arguing that bilateral agreements can be
useful even when a multilateral rule governs an issue because they often involve
commitments that are deeper and more nuanced than those of multilateral
agreements).
100
See id. at 373 (suggesting that countries sometimes sign bilateral
agreements in order to escape their existing obligations under multilateral
agreements).
101 Yang Jiang, China’s Pursuit of Free Trade Agreements: Is China Exceptional?,
17 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 238, 250 (2010).
102 See Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, China’s Regional Strategy, in POWER
SHIFT: CHINA & ASIA’S NEW DYNAMICS 48, 53 (David Shambaugh ed., 2005)
(describing China’s regional economic development strategy and choice between
two alternative approaches for becoming more integrated with the rest of the
region).
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in the region and the establishment of transnational production
lines but sealed off its domestic market from products made in the
region.103 By contrast, the United States has opened its domestic
markets in the pursuit of economic interdependence with FTA
partners in North and South America. China has followed the U.S.
policy of more open integration, inviting neighboring states to
establish a strong commercial presence in China, increasing
bilateral investment between the two states, and expanding the
relationship beyond mere economics (qua Japan). This in turn
encourages the perception that China’s economic growth presents
an opportunity, not a threat, to the partner’s prosperity.104
We cannot, of course, assume complete commensurability
between China’s FTA policy and the United States’. But since the
United States is more transparent about its selection process, some
indicia of China’s own trade policy can be plumbed analogically.
While China has not made a wholesale adoption of Western
models, whether multilateral or neoliberal, it has pragmatically
adapted elements of foreign models to suit its own conditions.105
It would not be surprising to see certain aspects of U.S. trade
policy reflected in China. We do not minimize the enormous
differences between the United States, a prime architect of the
postwar multilateral trading system, and China, a historically
reluctant participant in international organizations and only a
recent advocate of bilateral engagement. But U.S. policy presents a
typology that may, or may not apply, to China’s FTAs.
While serving as United States Trade Representative in 2003,
Robert Zoellick announced thirteen factors that he weighed in

103 Id. See also Webster, supra note 18, at 442–43 (explaining that in the period
since the Pacific War, Japan has created transnational production networks by
investing in the manufacturing and natural resource sectors of neighboring
countries). See generally RAYMOND J. AHEARN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33044,
JAPAN’S FREE TRADE AGREEMENT PROGRAM (2005) (discussing Japan’s attitude
toward free trade agreements).
104 See Webster, supra note 18, at 443–44 (arguing that China is viewed as a
desirable trading partner by other nations because it takes a conciliatory approach
to forming FTAs and promotes more than purely economic integration).
105 See generally RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA MODERNIZES: THREAT TO THE
WEST OR MODEL FOR THE REST? 5–6 (2007) (stating that China has embraced market
reforms and basic economic models but has not attempted to import wholesale
the liberal democratic form found in Euro-America).
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determining whether to launch FTA negotiations with a country.106
These factors included geographic diversity (Asia, Middle East,
Africa, the Americas), domestic business and agricultural interests,
cooperation in security and foreign policy, and ensuring a mix of
developed and developing countries.107 Zoellick further noted that
no single factor was dispositive nor was one factor weighed more
heavily than another. 108
Thereafter, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office Report (GAO Report) further subdivided the
Zoellick factors into six categories: partner country readiness
(adherence to rule of law, political will), economic benefit to the
United States, benefits to broader strategy of trade liberalization
(such as meeting WTO obligations), compatibility with U.S. trade
interests, support from Congress and the private sector, and the
resource constraints of the government.109 As noted in the GAO
Report, however, the most important factors in choosing trade
partners included “U.S. trade strategy, foreign policy, and foreign
economic goals.”110 The appendix to the Report lists individual
factors that the United States weighed in signing each FTA.111
Jeffrey Schott elegantly broke the Zoellick factors down into
four categories: domestic politics, economic policy considerations,
partner country commitments to trade liberalization, and foreign

106
See IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33463, TRADE
NEGOTIATIONS DURING THE 110TH CONGRESS 3 n.6 (2008) (stating that Zoellick
considered several factors to evaluate countries desiring to form trade agreements
with the United States and listing several of those criteria). The list of thirteen
factors is also available in a comprehensive report published by the Government
Accountability Office. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-233,
INTERNATIONAL TRADE: INTENSIFYING FREE TRADE NEGOTIATING AGENDA CALLS FOR
BETTER ALLOCATION OF STAFF AND RESOURCES 7–9 (2004) [hereinafter GAO REPORT],
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04233.pdf.
107 GAO REPORT, supra note 106, at 7–9.
108 Id. at 7.
109 Id. at 9–10.
110 Id. at 10.
111 See id. at 37–56 (describing the nature of various FTAs signed by the
United States, considerations that went into partner selection, and various
concerns raised by these agreements). For example, the Moroccan FTA stemmed
from six factors, which include (1) to promote openness, tolerance, and economic
growth across the Muslim world, (2) to recognize Morocco’s “staunch” alliance in
the war on terror, (3) to ensure Moroccan support for U.S. positions in WTO
negotiations, and (4) to encourage sustainable development, environmental
protection, transparency, and increased accountability of Moroccan government
institutions. Id. at 47–48.
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policy considerations.112 Because Schott abstracted the categories
in such a way that they do not exclusively reflect U.S.
characteristics, we adopt them for our analysis.
To be sure, it would be a mistake to view China’s FTA policy
solely through the prism of the United States. In general, China’s
foreign policy pays far less attention to the domestic political
situation and internal conditions of partner countries than the
United States. Indeed, since its founding, China has steadfastly
stuck to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
other countries, preferring instead to “live and let live.” If the
United States has sought to introduce a world order of
international institutions promoting multilateral trade and limiting
state sovereignty, China can be characterized as promoting a
worldview stressing “the equal, uninfringeable sovereignty of all
states large and small, Western and non-Western, rich and poor,
democratic and authoritarian, each to run its own system as it sees
fit, whether its methods suit Western standards or not.”113 In both
principle and practice, China is relatively less concerned with such
matters as a country’s human rights record, political system,
transparency, environmental protection, or commitment to
multilateral trading system.114
Notably, Vice Minister Yi Xiaozhun mentioned that China’s
selection criteria include first, that the potential partner maintain a
good political and diplomatic relationship with China; second, that
the potential partner has complementary economic structures with
China and share similar import/export patterns, and as a result,
the realization of free trade will not impose significant adverse
impact on China’s industries relating to national economy as well
as the people’s livelihood; third, that the potential partner has
significant domestic market and could also serve as a trade hub;

112 See Schott, supra note 34, at 365–71 (organizing into four broad categories
the criteria that the United States considers when deciding whether to begin FTA
negotiations with a country).
113 Andrew J. Nathan, Principles of China’s Foreign Policy, ASIA FOR EDUCATORS,
http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/special/china_1950_forpol_principles.htm
(last
visited Oct. 16, 2011).
114 China’s relationships with such countries as North Korea, Burma, Sudan,
and Zimbabwe are often singled out to show that China supports “rogue
regimes.” A less tendentious view of these relationships would suggest that
China places economic, geographical, and historical linkages above political ones.
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fourth, that the potential partner shares a common desire with
China to enter into FTAs.115
Of course, factors such as domestic politics, economic
considerations, and foreign policy also influence China’s selection
of partner countries. Take the issue of domestic politics. Indeed,
politics in China manifest themselves rather differently than
politics in the United States, where a democratically elected
Congressman reflects the interest of the member himself, his
constituents, and powerful lobbying groups. In China, domestic
politics are far less transparent. After a series of internal
discussions, policies are often announced by central leaders, and
then left to the responsible organ or agency for implementation.
Nonetheless, it is still possible to discern the influence of domestic
politics on Chinese FTA patterns.
4.1. Domestic Politics
One striking example of domestic politics influencing trade
policy may be the China-ASEAN FTA. For many years, China has
tried to build up its western and southwestern regions, whose
economic development lags significantly behind richer coastal
areas. In the late 1990s, leaders from various provinces in
southwest China, such as Sichuan, Yunnan and Guangxi,
pressured the central government to enter an FTA with ASEAN.116
Provincial leaders hoped that tariff-free access to Southeast Asia
would make Chinese manufactured and agricultural goods more
competitive in those markets. Moreover, increased trade flows
between southwest China and Southeast Asia (Laos, Vietnam,
Thailand) would convince Beijing to increase transportation
services and infrastructure (roads, railroads, airline routes)
between these two areas. By directly shipping goods over the
southwestern border, Chinese manufacturers and farmers could
avoid the transportation costs of first sending goods to China’s east
coast and then shipping them to Southeast Asia. Given the very
low profit margins associated with the agricultural products grown
115 See Interview with Vice Minister Yi Xiaozhun, supra note 78 (outlining
China’s selection criteria for pursuing its free trade partners).
116 See The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Who’s Happy, Who’s Not, supra
note 96 (quoting Zheng Hui, Finance Professor at Fudan University, as stating that
the Chinese government’s decision to propose the China-ASEAN Free Trade
Agreement was influenced by local government leaders in China’s southwest).
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in these areas, a reduction in transport fees would significantly
boost profitability and competitiveness. In the case of the ASEAN
agreement, then, domestic political pressure played an important
role in Zhu Rongji’s proposal of 2000. A similar motivation—
developing the western provinces—likely propelled the ChinaPakistan FTA.117
4.2. Economic Considerations
Economic considerations weigh heavily in China’s FTA
calculus.
Chief among them is the continuation of its
unprecedented economic growth. This in turn requires expanding,
or at least maintaining, high growth in such sectors as construction,
heavy manufacturing (steel), light manufacturing (copper),
infrastructure (railways, roads), and the production of consumer
goods. 118 These forms of economic activity require enormous
amounts of natural resources, which China has assiduously
scoured the world for, notably in Africa,119 Australia,120 and South
America.121 At present, China is the largest consumer of copper,
117 See Syed Fazl-e-Haider, Pakistan’s Trade Bear-hug with China, ASIA TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2010, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LD21Df01.html
(stating that China and Pakistan are interested in developing the water potential
of Pakistan’s northern areas, which connects to Xinjiang, China’s western
province).
118 See, e.g., MINISTRY OF FOREIGN TRADE AND TOURISM IN PERU AND THE
MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, PERU-CHINA FREE
TRADE AGREEMENT: JOINT FEASIBILITY STUDY 6–7 (2007) [hereinafter PERU-CHINA:
JOINT FEASIBILITY STUDY] (noting that China’s highest growth industries include
manufacturing, construction, and transportation); see also David Menzie et al., U.S.
Geological Survey, China’s Growing Appetite for Minerals (explaining that as China
continues to grow, the country will need to consume large quantities of minerals
as it enters each of several development stages: infrastructure development, light
manufacturing, heavy manufacturing, consumer goods development, and the
development of services).
119 See French, supra note 3 (describing the considerable investments that
China has made in Africa in its quest to obtain natural resources); DEBORAH
BRAUTIGAM, THE DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA (2009)
(analyzing Chinese aid and investment in Africa).
120 See Minerals Council of Australia, Fact Sheet—The Australia China Minerals
Trade, Apr. 2005, available at http://www.minerals.org.au/__data/assets
/pdf_file/0009/8829/MCA_aus-china_fact_sheet_april-1.pdf (presenting mineral
market statistics in favor of a China-Australia FTA).
121 See China’s Growing Influence: Objectives and Strategies: Hearing Before the
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 109th Cong. 158–60 (2005)
(statement of Claudio Loser, Senior Fellow, Inter-American Dialogue) (stating that
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tin, zinc, steel, iron ore, and coal, and the second largest consumer
of aluminum, petroleum and lead, and the fourth largest consumer
of gold.122
China’s pressing need for raw materials illuminates several of
its recent choices for FTA partners.123 Chile, Costa Rica, and Peru
account for a few drops in China’s ocean of world trade, a topic
more fully explored below. But vast copper reserves made Chile
an ideal partner for a free trade agreement with China, while
Peru’s silver, iron ore, and copper were also attractive. By entering
into FTAs with these countries, China was able to correct trade
deficits that it had with both countries due to its heavy reliance on
their mineral imports.
At the same time, China must open up new markets for its
exports. In today’s global economy, and particularly after the
global recession, reliance on exporting to the EU, United States,
and Japan will no longer serve all of China. China is particularly
interested in promoting agricultural and manufacturing trade with
Southeast Asia, which will help develop its largely agrarian and
underdeveloped western regions, such as Xinjiang, Tibet, and
Yunnan.
Like the United States and Japan, China prefers to enter FTAs
with countries with which it transacts very little trade.124 Though
China’s main trading partners include the United States, EU, and
Japan, there is very little chance of an FTA with any of these
countries. An FTA with either Japan or the United States would
require both parties to overlook a long history of mutual suspicion,
while certain sectors—such as agriculture and intellectual
property—could not be arranged satisfactorily as between China
and the United States, or China and Japan. Rather, as one Chinese
China’s demand for energy and natural resources has contributed to the economic
growth Latin America has experienced in recent years).
122 See Minerals Council of Australia, supra note 120.
123 See, e.g., Yang Liyan & Lei Xiaohang (杨丽艳和雷晓航), FTA Zhanlüe xia
Woguo Haiwai Nengyuan Touzi de Falü Wenti Yanjiu (FTA 战略下我国海外能源投资
的法律问题研究) [On the Several Legal Issues of China’s Energy Investment Abroad
under FTA], 4 ZHENG FA LUN CONG (政法论丛) [J. POL. SCI. & L.] (China) 67, 67–68
(2009) (illustrating the history, trends, and developments of China’s energy
investment abroad from the 1990s to the present and addressing the legal issues
China may encounter when making energy investment abroad) .
124 The United States, for instance, has signed FTAs with Oman, Bahrain,
Morocco, and Singapore, none of which conduct significant bilateral trade with
the United States.
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observer stated, “China does not have the confidence to open its
market to those economies that are huge and far more advanced
than its own.” 125 China has opted for countries with small
economies and low volumes of bilateral trade, which will prevent
the Chinese domestic market from experiencing a flood of cheap
imports into its domestic market. Furthermore, entering into FTAs
with those relatively less powerful trading partners is certainly
more manageable for China. Moreover, it could also help China
diversify its import sources and export market. By focusing on
countries with abundant natural resources, China can ensure that it
obtains the materials it needs to promote economic growth without
endangering domestic industries through excessive competition.
Finally, China seeks to complete FTAs with countries that have
healthy economies and strong credit ratings. Agencies like
Standard and Poor’s and Fitch have rated Chile and Peru as South
America’s first and second most creditworthy countries,
respectively, and Argentina, Bolivia, and Ecuador as its least. 126
Therefore, it is not surprising that China first signed an FTA with
Chile, and then Peru, while an FTA with Argentina, Bolivia, or
Ecuador does not appear to be in the cards.
4.3. Foreign Policy
Foreign policy may not be as important to Chinese trade policy
as it is in United States trade policy, but it still plays a key role. In
selecting FTA partners, the United States considers the country’s
adherence to rule of law, as well as its commitment to trade
liberalization, and to WTO commitments more specifically.127 This
is not so for China. As noted above, China’s traditional concern for
state sovereignty renders it essentially uninterested in a partner
country’s internal affairs, such as adherence to rule of law, respect
for international norms, or interest in democratic politics. Nor

125 Sheng Lijun, China-ASEAN Free Trade Area: Origins, Developments and
Strategic Motivations 8 (Inst. of Se. Asian Studies, Working Paper: International
Politics & Security Issues Series No. 1, 2003).
126 See PERU-CHINA: JOINT FEASIBILITY STUDY, supra note 118, at 12 (listing the
Moody’s, S&P and Fitch ratings for Chile, Peru, Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and
several other Latin American nations as of 2007).
127 See GAO REPORT, supra note 106, at 8–10 (outlining factors that the United
States weighs in selecting FTA partners and identifying a countries’ commitment
to the “trade disciplines” of the WTO as a factor).
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does China seem especially concerned with whether a country
embraces free trade, multilateralism, or another economic
paradigm. China does not appear to weigh a partner country’s
commitment to multilateral trade liberalization in making its FTA
choices. Chile, for instance, has signed many bilateral and
multilateral FTAs, 128 which cover seventy-five percent of its
trade. 129 Pakistan, by contrast, has signed only three bilateral
FTAs, and one regional one.130
Two additional foreign policy considerations of the U.S. Trade
Representative include striking a balance between developed and
developing countries and maintaining geographic diversity.131 The
former is important because developed countries currently have
the market to purchase U.S. goods and services, while developing
countries are likely to do so in the future. Such arrangements can
help lock in longer-term market plans. Geographic diversity is
important because of the United States’ desire to be active in many
parts of the globe and to hedge against regional economic
downturns, such as the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98.
China, too, seems concerned with striking a balance between
developed and developing countries in its FTA platform.
Although China has concluded a greater number of FTAs with
developing countries, recently concluded FTAs with New Zealand
and Singapore as well as ongoing negotiations with Australia
indicate that China also places a premium on developed countries.
128
See Tratados de Libre Comercio Firmados por Chile [Free Trade Agreements
Ratified by Chile], BIBLIOTECA DEL CONGRESO NACIONAL DE CHILE-BCN [THE NAT’L
CONG.
LIBRARY
OF
CHILE],
http://www.bcn.cl/carpeta_temas
/temas_portada.2005-11-29.5590492629/area_2.2005-12-01.2439583052 (last visited
Oct. 7, 2011) (identifying Canada, Mexico, Central America, the European
Community, the United States, Korea, the European Free Trade Area, and China
as FTA partners of Chile). In addition, Chile is negotiating treaties with many
other states, including Thailand, Indonesia, and the Gulf States.
129 See Antkiewicz & Whalley, supra note 17, pt. 5 (stating that seventy-five
percent of Chile’s foreign trade is governed by FTAs).
130 See Tanveer Ahmed, Nepal Intends to Sign FTA with Pakistan in JEC Meeting,
DAILY TIMES, July 24, 2010, http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page
=2010%5C07%5C24%5Cstory_24-7-2010_pg5_3 (reporting Nepal’s intention to
become the second country in South Asia to enter a free trade agreement with
Pakistan).
131 See GAO Report, supra note 106, at 8–9 (listing the “[n]eed to ensure a mix
of developed and developing countries” and the “[n]eed to do FTAs in each of the
world’s major regions” as amongst the Trade Representative’s thirteen factors in
targeting potential FTA partners).
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China wants to create a sound economic environment in which to
trade all of its exports—electronic and other consumer goods to
developed countries and agricultural products and textiles to
developing countries. Nonetheless, certain policymakers in China
have viewed FTAs as a new bridge to facilitate cooperation
between China and other developing countries.132
Geographic diversity, at this stage, seems to be a secondary
concern for China, whose FTA preferences are circumscribed to the
Asia-Pacific region. As noted above, 133 China has invested
considerable diplomatic resources in establishing itself as a
regional power and, to a lesser extent, a global one. As economic
matters are now firmly part of that diplomatic initiative, FTAs will
tread the same path forged by China’s recent regional
engagements in politics and security. The FTAs with ASEAN,
Singapore, and Pakistan, all indicate the importance of location in
to China’s FTA strategy. Slightly further afield, China has also
signed agreements with countries on both sides of the Pacific
Ocean, such as Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Peru, and New Zealand.
Its ongoing discussions with Australia suggest the geographic
limits of its strategy: the Pacific. This suggests that China is not
aiming toward the strict geographic contiguity often associated
with “natural” trading blocs, 134 but rather the idea that China
wants to be a—if not the—center of gravity in the Asia-Pacific
region.
On the other hand, China’s discussions with European
countries such as Norway and Iceland, the Gulf Cooperation
Council, and the Southern Africa Customs Union hint at a larger
global strategy. But the seriousness of such negotiations remains

132 See Zhu Hong (朱洪), Ziyou Maoyi Xieding—Zhongguo yu Fazhanzhong
Guojia Nannan Hezuo de Xinqiaoliang (自由贸易协定—中国与发展中国家南南合作的
新 桥 樑 ) [Free Trade Agreements—New Bridge for South-South Cooperation
between China and other Developing Countries], 9 Guoji Maoyi (国际贸易) [INT’L
TRADE] (China) 8, 8 (2009) (arguing that, according to statistical data, free trade
agreements assist in the economic and trade relations between China and other
developing countries).
133 See supra Section 3.1 (outlining China’ increased regional diplomatic
efforts since the 1990s designed to position itself as a regional leader).
134 See Krugman, supra note 59, at 12 (observing that neighboring countries
are “natural” trading partners who would trade with each other even in the
absence of FTAs).
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unclear. Certain negotiations have been stalled for years,135 while
others do not appear to be concluding any time soon. For the
foreseeable future, China will most likely cling more closely to its
neighbors in Asia and across the Pacific.
5.

CHINA’S FTAS AND SIMILAR AGREEMENTS

China has signed FTAs with ASEAN, Pakistan, Chile, Mexico,
Peru, Costa Rica, Singapore, and New Zealand. 136 Mainland
China preceded the FTA boom by signing Cooperative Economic
Partnership Agreements (CEPAs) with Hong Kong and Macau. 137
The Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement between
Chinese mainland and Taiwan recognizes the tremendous crossstrait economic activity of recent years.138 As this amounts to more
than a dozen agreements, analyzing each one (as well as their
numerous annexes and follow-up agreements) would be
impractical. Accordingly, this Section focuses on three treaties:
China FTAs with ASEAN, Peru, and New Zealand. This grouping
captures the geographic and developmental diversity of China’s
FTA partners, as well as the variety of forms the agreements have
themselves taken. China’s FTAs do not follow one path, but adapt
to partner preferences. After a decade, the greatest defining
feature of Chinese FTAs is their malleability. Though clear
principles underlie the FTAs, each agreement is itself the product
of a unique collaboration between China and the partner country
guided by the circumstances of the day.
135 The last round of China-SACU negotiations, for instance, took place in
2004. See China-SACU FTA, CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn
/topic/ensacu.shtml (last visited Oct. 16, 2011) (asserting that China and SACU’s
negotiations are ongoing, even though the most recent meeting took place on June
28, 2004).
136 For a list of China’s FTAs and similar agreements, see infra app., 1.
137 PAC. ECONOMIC COOPERATION COUNCIL & APEC BUS. ADVISORY COUNCIL,
AN APEC TRADE AGENDA? THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF A FREE TRADE AREA OF THE
ASIA PACIFIC 59, available at http://www.apec.org.au/docs/061120_FTAAP.pdf
(discussing China’s approach to trade agreements, including its CEPAs with
Hong Kong and Macau).
138 See Kun-Ming Chen et al., Impact of Cross-Strait Trade Liberalization: A
Computable General Equilibrium Analysis, 17 CHINA & WORLD ECON. 106, 106–07,
119–20 (2009) (noting that an Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement is
under “intensive examination” and concluding that trade liberalization between
mainland China and Taiwan should have positive effects on the region’s
economies).
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Before describing the characteristics of Chinese FTAs, another
comparative note provides a model by which to make sense of
them. Like China, the United States has signed a flurry of FTAs in
the new millennium, many with the same countries as China.139
The United States has derived a model,140 as well as enhancements
to that model,141 to which it more or less adheres in negotiating
FTAs. The model includes sixteen subject areas, two restricted
categories (agriculture and labor mobility), and other rules for
safeguards such as antidumping or countervailing duties.142 The
enhanced model increases protection of intellectual property and
investment while covering new areas such as corruption,
transparency, and capacity-building.143 For present discussion, the
specifics of the U.S. model are secondary to the simple fact that the
U.S. hews to a model (or two) when negotiating FTAs. In reality,
because of their limited bargaining power, small economies like
Bahrain, Morocco, and Oman largely tend to acquiesce to U.S.
standards when finalizing FTAs.
By contrast, China imposes less stringent standards on its FTA
partners.
The substance of Chinese FTAs shifts with the
preferences and legal requirements of the partner. If one partner
wants to take the process in steps, China obliges. If another
partner wants a more comprehensive arrangement, China agrees.
Some FTAs cover the three pillars of FTAs—trade in goods, trade
in services, and investment protections—but some do not. In
addition, FTAs may include special provisions for labor and

139
Under the second Bush administration (2001–09), the United States
entered into FTAs with Singapore (entering force in 2004), Chile (entering force in
2004), Australia (entering force in 2005), Morocco (2004), Central America (2005),
Bahrain (2006), Oman (2006) and Peru (2007). See 2008 TRADE POLICY AGENDA &
2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE TRADE
AGREEMENTS PROGRAM, at 107–17 (2008). The Bush administration also signed
FTAs with Korea, Colombia, and Panama in 2007, but Congress has yet to
approve them. Id. at 112–16.
140 See C. O’Neal Taylor, The U.S. Approach to Regionalism: Recent Past and
Future, 15 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 411, 420–26 (2009) (identifying the United
States’ initial model FTA as the “NAFTA model”).
141 See id. at 428–33 (describing the United States’ enhanced model as the
“WTO-plus model”).
142 See id. at 421–22, 426 (detailing the organization and subject matter of the
United States’ initial FTA model).
143 See id. at 430–34 (describing the additions made to the United States’ initial
FTA model towards development of its enhanced FTA model).
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environment 144 or enhanced protections against expropriation. 145
Developing countries such as Pakistan and ASEAN have also
negotiated “Early Harvest Programs,” whereby China opens up its
agricultural markets by lowering tariffs on partner country exports
before the partner country reciprocates.146 This conciliatory gesture
assures trade partners that China acts with their interests in mind,
and helps quell the “China threat” that afflicts much of Asia (and
the world).
5.1. ASEAN
The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement took a decade to
negotiate and enter into force, a reflection of ASEAN’s gradual
approach to international relations and binding agreements more
generally. Through repeated interactions between 2001, when
Premier Zhu Rongji proposed the FTA at the Fourth China-ASEAN
Leadership Forum in Singapore, and 2010, when it came into force,
China adhered to the ASEAN way: meeting regularly to discuss
important issues, agreeing to smaller issues before tackling more

144 See Free Trade Agreement Between The Government of New Zealand and
The Government of the People’s Republic of China, China-N.Z., art. 96, Apr. 7,
2008 [hereinafter NZCFTA], available at http://chinafta.govt.nz/1-Theagreement/2-Text-of-the-agreement/0-downloads/NZ-ChinaFTA-Agreementtext.pdf (establishing that the parties would develop joint initiatives to manage
environmental risks and establish work programs).
145 See Free Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Peru, China-Peru, art.
133, Apr. 28, 2009, available at http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex
/bilu_xdwb_en.pdf (agreeing that neither party expropriate against the other’s
investments except under certain conditions); see also NZCFTA, supra note 144, art.
145 (stipulating that neither country shall expropriate against investments of the
other unless it is compensated and carried out for a public purpose, in accordance
with applicable domestic law, in a non-discriminatory manner, and is not contrary
to a Party’s undertaking).
146 See generally Agreement on the Early Harvest Programme for the Free
Trade Agreement Between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and
the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, China-Pak., April 5, 2005,
available at
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/pakistanarticle/chpakistan/pakhwmy
/200809/467_1.html (agreeing to implement an Early Harvest Program between
China and Pakistan beginning in 2006); see also ERLINDA M. MEDALLA & JENNY D.
BALBOA, THE IMPACT OF ASEAN-CHINA FTA EARLY HARVEST PROGRAM: THE CASE OF
THE PHILIPPINES WITH FOCUS ON SHORT-RUN EFFECTS ON THE AGRICULTURE SECTOR 9–
11 (Phillipine Inst. for Dev. Studies, Research Paper Series No. 2007-01, 2007),
http://dirp4.pids.gov.ph/ris/rps/pidsrp0701.pdf (providing an overview of the
ASEAN-China FTA and the Early Harvest Program component to the agreement).
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sensitive ones, and making progress incrementally instead of in
one fell swoop. 147 China even made concessionary gestures, such
as the Early Harvest Program, to elicit goodwill and trust from
ASEAN. 148
China was the first country to sign an FTA with ASEAN,149
followed by Korea,150 Japan,151 Australia,152 and India.153 The China
FTA is best understood as a series of agreements, rather than the
“big bang” type of pact favored by developed countries like the
United States, Japan, and Australia. China and ASEAN first signed
a Framework Agreement in 2002, in essence an agreement to

147 Herman S. Kraft, Japan and the United States in ASEAN-China Relations, in
ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS: REALTIES AND PROSPECTS 90, 92 (Saw Swee-Hock & Chin
Kin Wah eds., 2005) (discussing Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s 2001 ChinaASEAN FTA proposal); Ong Keng Yong, Securing a Win-Win Partnership for
ASEAN and China, in ASEAN-CHINA RELATIONS: REALTIES AND PROSPECTS, supra, at
19, 22 (noting that ASEAN and China “have targeted to realize the Free Trade
Area in 2010 for the ASEAN-6”).
148
SHULAN YE, CHINA’S REGIONAL POLICY IN EAST ASIA AND ITS
CHARACTERISTICS 6 (Univ. of Nottingham China Policy Inst., Discussion Paper No.
66, 2010), http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/cpi/documents/discussion-papers
/discussion-paper-66-china-regional-policy-shulan-ye.pdf (observing that the
Early Harvest Program provided ASEAN states favorably treatments to
demonstrate China’s “benignancy”).
149 See Sen & Srivastava, supra note 49, at 196 (indicating that the ASEANChina FTA acted as a catalyst for the proliferation of FTAs in the region, and
triggered a new focus on bilateralism among ASEAN countries).
150 Korea and ASEAN also signed agreements on trade in goods and services
which entered into force in 2007, as well as an agreement on investment signed in
2009. See Yoon Ja-young, Korea-ASEAN FTA to Boost Trade Ties, KOREA TIMES, June
2, 2009 (discussing Korea’s signing of the Korea-ASEAN FTA and other earlier
related agreements with ASEAN).
151
Japan and ASEAN signed a comprehensive (goods, services, and
investments) FTA with ASEAN in 2008. See ASEAN-Japanese FTA to Take Effect
Dec. 1, JAPAN TIMES, Oct. 22, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/nb20081022a6.html (reporting that the ASEAN-Japan FTA would soon take
effect and cover goods services and investments).
152 See Joint Media Statement on the Signing of the Agreement Establishing
the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area (Feb. 27, 2009),
http://aanzfta.asean.org/uploads/jms/AANZFTA_Signing_27_Feb_09_FINAL.p
df (announcing the signing of the Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-AustraliaNew Zealand Free Trade Agreement, which covers goods, services, and
investment, among other measures).
153 See Joint Media Statement, The Seventh AEM-India Consultations (Aug.
13,
2009),
http://www.asean.org/JMS-7th-ASEAN-India-Consultations.pdf
(announcing the signing of the “ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement and
other AIFTA-related [a]greements”).
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agree.154 The Framework articulates the broad economic aims of
the China-ASEAN relationship (strengthening cooperation in trade
and investment, liberalizing services, and exploring new areas for
economic cooperation) and acknowledges the special status of the
least developed members of ASEAN (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,
and Myanmar), but imposes no legally binding commitments. 155
These commitments have instead been assumed incrementally,
over the course of many years. They include the Early Harvest
Program (2004), Agreement on Trade in Goods (2005), Agreement
on Trade in Services (2007), Agreement on Investment (2009), and
other agreements on dispute settlement and information
technology. 156 The trade area itself took effect on January 1, 2010,
six years after the Early Harvest Program went into effect. 157 It is
still too early to conclude what economic effect the FTA will have
on bilateral economic relations. But the rapid increase in bilateral
trade, from $40 billion in 2000,158 to $193 billion in 2008,159 suggests
that both sides are gaining from increasingly favorable market
access.160
154 See generally Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic CoOperation between the People’s Republic of China and the Association of South
East Asian Nations, China-ASEAN (Nov. 4, 2002), available at
http://gjs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/Nocategory/200212/20021200056711.html?36
1458593=2989170482 (establishing a framework for free trade negotiations
between China and ASEAN).
155 See generally id. (providing generally the economic goals and contours for
China and ASEAN to consider during the course of free trade negotiations).
156 China-ASEAN FTA, CHINA FTA NETWORK, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn
/topic/chinaasean.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (outlining the significant trade
agreements signed intermittently between China and ASEAN in the years
following the 2002 Framework Agreement).
157 See Agreement on Trade in Goods of the Framework Agreement on
Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation Between the People’s Republic of China
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, China-ASEAN, annex 1, ¶ 6
(Nov.
29,
2004),
available
at
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/dongmeng
/annex/xieyi2004en.pdf (agreeing that “[e]ach Party shall eliminate all its tariffs
for tariff lines . . . not later than 1 January 2010”).
158 See Suthiphand Chirathivat, 13 J. ASIAN ECON. 671, 673 (2002) (noting that
China trade totaled “U.S. $39.5 billion in the year 2000”).
159 See Press Release, ASEAN Secretariat, China Ready to Accommodate on
ASEAN-China FTA (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.asean.org/24209.htm (“The total
trade between ASEAN and China reached US$ 192.7 billion [sic] in 2008.”).
160
See Zhongguo-Dongmeng Jingmao Buzhang Huiyi zai Yuenan Xiangang
Zhaokai, Huiyi Jiji Pingjia Zhongguo-Dongmeng Zimaoqu Shishi Jinzhan Qingkuang,
(中国—东盟经贸部长会议在越南岘港召开会议积极评价中国—东盟自贸区实施进展
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5.2. Peru
China and Peru initiated negotiations for an FTA in September
2007 during an APEC meeting in Sydney, Australia, highlighting
APEC’s centrality to China’s FTA diplomacy.161 Eight rounds of
negotiations later in April 2009, leaders from both countries signed
an FTA in the Great Hall of the People. 162 Fourteen months of
negotiations is a relatively short period of time,163 especially when
compared with China’s dealings with ASEAN and New Zealand,
suggesting that China can respond quickly and nimbly to partner
expectations.164 Here, Peru’s experience of negotiating agreements

情况 ) [China-ASEAN Economic and Trade Ministerial Conference was Held in Da
Nang, Vietnam and the Implementation Progress of the China-ASEAN FTA was
Positively Evaluated], ZHONGGUO ZIYOU MAOYIQU FUWUWANG (中国自由贸易服务区
服 务 网 ) [CHINA FTA NETWORK] (Aug. 26, 2010, 12:20:50 PM),
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/article/chinadongmeng/dongmengnews/201008/321
6_1.html (reporting on the 9th AEM-MOFCOM Consultation held in Vietnam and
detailing the economic benefits both sides have enjoyed as a result of the FTA).
161 See China-Peru Free Trade Pact Takes Effect, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERVICE,
Mar. 1, 2010 (noting that the China-Peru FTA was signed in 2008 following
fourteen months of negotiations); China, Peru Launch FTA Talks, PEOPLE’S DAILY,
Sept.
7,
2007,
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883
/6257682.html (reporting that China and Peru commenced FTA negotiations in
Australia “on the sidelines” of an APEC meeting occurring in Sidney).
162 See id. (stating that the FTA was signed April 2009 in Beijing).
163 See China, Peru Sign Free Trade Deal Amid Global Financial Crisis, GLOBAL
TIMES,
Apr.
28,
2009,
http://www.globaltimes.cn/china/choice/200904/428436.html (remarking that negotiation of the China-Peru FTA lasted
fourteen months).
164 The New Zealand FTA took over three years to negotiate. See Shu-Ching
Jean Chen, Landmark Trade Deal Struck by China, New Zealand, FORBES, April 7,
2008,
http://www.forbes.com/2008/04/07/china-nz-fta-markets-econ-cx_jc
_0407markets2.html (noting that negotiation of the New Zealand FTA spanned
three years). The Australia FTA, negotiation of which began in 2003, has yet to
materialize. See Yanning Yu, Trade Remedies: The Impact on the Proposed AustraliaChina Free Trade Agreement, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 267, 267–68 (2010) (commenting
that as of January 2009, no final FTA had been agreed upon). The ASEAN
agreement was laid out between 2002 and 2009. See generally CHINA FTA
NETWORK, supra note 15 (providing press releases from 2004 to 2009 chronicling
the China-ASEAN agreement). The Early Harvest program under the agreement
began in 2004. See Sarah Y. Tong & Catherine Chong Siew Keng, China-ASEAN
Free Trade Area in 2010: A Regional Perspective 17, app. 1 (Sing. Univ. E. Asian Inst.,
Background Brief No. 519), available at http://www.eai.nus.edu.sg/BB519.pdf
(noting that “the Early Harvest Program was implemented on [January 1, 2004]”).
The goods agreement with ASEAN’s most developed countries began in January
2010, while the goods agreement with the least developed members is scheduled
to begin in 2015. See China-ASEAN Free Trade Areas Starts Operation, supra note 67
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with the United States (2006), Chile (2006), Canada (2008), and
Singapore (2008) suggested it may prefer a comprehensive
approach. 165 More important, the agreement was signed amidst
worldwide economic recession. When many countries resorted to
protectionism, 166 Peru and China signaled that their economies
were strong enough to withstand the additional pressure of
cheaper exports.
The FTA covers the full basket of goods, services, and
investment, and would eventually include ninety percent of all
goods. 167
Significantly, the “FTA takes into account the
sensitivities of both countries.”168 One salient feature of the PeruChina FTA is enhanced protection when investment is
expropriated for national security reasons, a mandate of the 1993
Peruvian Constitution. 169 In addition, the FTA also calls for a more
legalistic review of investment disputes. 170 Article 63 of the

(reporting at the start of 2010 that the China-FTA agreement had taken effect and
that in 2015, the agreement would take effect as to various developing members).
165
Peru Country Brief, AUSTL. DEP’T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE,
http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/peru/peru_brief.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2011)
(providing an overview of Peru’s recent trade strategies, including its activity in
signing FTAs).
166 For instance, the United States’ imposition of tariffs on Chinese tires, as
well as the “Buy American” provisions of the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, led many to fear a return to Depression-era
protectionism. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON.,
US PROTECTIONIST IMPULSES IN THE WAKE OF THE GREAT RECESSION: REPORT TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE RESEARCH FOUNDATION 14–27 (2010),
available
at
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/hufbauer201003.pdf
(detailing the United States’ shift towards more protectionist trade policies during
the current economic recession).
167 See China-Peru Free Trade Pact Takes Effect, supra note 161 (listing some of
the ninety percent of goods that would eventually be tariff-free as a result of the
agreement, ranging from Chinese electronics to Peruvian fruits and minerals).
168 The China-Peru Free Trade Agreement: A Brief Overview, SQUIRE SANDERS
(June
2010),
http://www.ssd.com/the_china-peru_free_trade_agreement_a
_brief_overview.
169 See Free Trade Agreement between the Government of the People’s
Republic of China and the Government of the Republic of Peru, China-Peru, art.
133 (April 28, 2009), available at fta.mofcom.gov.cn/bilu/annex/bilu_xdwb_en.pdf
(detailing the conditions which must be met to expropriate investments).
170
See id., ch. 15 (detailing rules and procedures for legal “dispute
settlement” under the agreement).
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Peruvian Constitution grants foreign investors the same privileges
and protections as Peruvian nationals. 171
5.3. New Zealand
After fifteen rounds of negotiations over three years, China
signed its first FTA with a developed country, New Zealand, in
2009. 172 As we might expect, this comprehensive agreement
(goods, services, and investment) is predicted to cover ninety-six
percent of bilateral trade, putting it more comfortably within the
WTO approved requirements of FTAs. 173 One controversial aspect
of the FTA was a provision that permits skilled Chinese workers to
work in New Zealand. 174 With a high unemployment rate for
certain skilled workers, China aims to employ its excess labor in
New Zealand’s schools, restaurants, offices, and various other
trades. 175 Three types of labor provisions exist in the agreement.
First, executives and managers in certain service areas (e.g.
computers, construction, and education) can apply for three-year
renewable visas to work in New Zealand. 176 Second, a set number
of positions are available for jobs with “Chinese characteristics,”
171
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF PERU, art. 63, available at
http://web.parliament.go.th/parcy/sapa_db/cons_doc/constitutions/data/Peru
/peru.pdf.
172 See China, New Zealand Sign Free Trade Deal, CHINA FTA NETWORK (April 4,
2009,
7:24),
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/ennewzealand/ennewzealandnews/200911
/1626_1.html (noting that China and New Zealand signed an FTA “after 15
rounds of negotiations over three years”).
173 See id. (providing details on the China-New Zealand FTA, including its
coverage).
174 BELL GULLY, NEW ZEALAND-CHINA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: SUMMARY OF
KEY OUTCOMES 22 (2008), available at http://www.bellgully.com/resources/pdfs
/NZ_China_FTA.pdf (noting that under the FTA, certain Chinese workers will be
permitted to enter New Zealand to work in specified occupations for which “an
identified skills shortage” exists).
175 See Educated and Fearing the Future in China, N.Y. TIMES, March 7, 2010,
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/educated-and-fearingthe-future-in-china (providing commentary on the shortage of skilled jobs
available to educated Chinese workers); see also N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND TRADE, supra note 83, at 33–34 (summarizing the China-New Zealand FTA’s
temporary employment entry provision, which allows skilled Chinese workers to
work in those New Zealand industries which possess labor shortages).
176 N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, supra note 83, at 33
(overviewing the provision of the China-New Zealand FTA which temporarily
allows Chinese executives and managers to work in New Zealand)
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such as Chinese chefs, Mandarin teachers, wushu instructors, and
practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine.177 A third group of
positions opens after a determination that New Zealand has a skills
shortage in a particular field. If local labor cannot fill the post, up
to one hundred Chinese citizens may work in a very diverse group
of occupations for up to three years.178
An additional feature of the China New Zealand FTA is the
inclusion of labor and environmental provisions. Since 2001, the
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has required
the incorporation of environmental 179 and labor standards180 into
FTAs. Though not part of the FTA itself—probably a concession to
China—these provisions impose legally binding obligations on
China to cooperate with New Zealand on matters such as
sustainable development, abolition of child and compulsory labor,
and elimination of employment discrimination.181 To achieve these
lofty goals, the Labor MOU provides for dialogues and cooperative
activities on labor laws, working conditions, and labor inspection.
Likewise, the Environment Cooperation Agreement (ECA) obliges
China to cooperate with New Zealand on environmental
management, nature conservation, and in various technological
fields. The ECA permits members of the public, and NGOs, to
177 See NZCFTA, supra note 144, annex 11 (providing temporary employment
in New Zealand to Chinese naturals for specified qualifying jobs).
178 See id. (allowing temporary skilled employment in New Zealand for
Chinese naturals in “sectors in which New Zealand has an identified skills
shortage”).
Twenty-five occupations—boatbuilder, computer application
engineer, diesel mechanic, plumber, radiation therapist, and university lecturer,
among others—are covered. See NZ: New immigration policies for Chinese as a result
of FTA, WORKPERMIT.COM (Sept. 25, 2008), http://www.workpermit.com/news
/2008-09-25/new-zealand/free-trade-agreement-new-immigration-policieschinese-workers.htm (listing the types of skilled Chinese workers permitted to
work in New Zealand under the FTA).
179 See New Zealand and the World Trade Organisation: Framework for Integrating
Environment Issues into Free Trade Agreements, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS &
TRADE,
http://mfat.govt.nz/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/NZ-and-theWTO/Trade-Issues/0-environment-framework.php (last updated Oct. 12, 2010)
(highlighting New Zealand’s concern for the environmental impact of its FTAs,
and its dedication to ensuring that its FTAs contribute to sustainability).
180
See Trade Issues: Framework for Integrating Labor Standards and Trade
Agreements, N.Z. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, http://www.mfat.govt.nz
/Trade-and-Economic-Relations/NZ-and-the-WTO/Trade-Issues/0-labourframework.php (last visited Oct. 17, 2011) (highlighting New Zealand’s focus on
trade and labor issues in the context of its global trade policies).
181 Id.
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submit views on the efficacy of the ECA, potentially applying
pressure on China from sectors of the society that it has heretofore
managed to neutralize.
6.

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON CHINA’S FTA
STRATEGY

China has incentive “to commit to multilateral disciplines”
with the WTO, through which it can gain “non-discriminatory
access to large markets” and intercept discrimination by fellow
large powers.182 On the other hand, China has also been pursuing
its free trade agreement strategy, as FTAs can serve its need for
flexibilities in trade and economic negotiations, which is
unavailable in multilateral negotiations.
Moreover, FTA
negotiations present an opportune platform for China to ask for
what it truly wants, whereas it would have difficulty openly
making such requests during the course of multilateral
negotiations.183 Furthermore, with the unpromising prospects of
U.S. demand in the near future, FTAs could provide China with
significant regional markets. In any event, while pursuing FTAs,
China should also be proactive in pushing for multilateral
arrangements.184 In sum, China has to strike a balance in its trade
strategy which includes both multilateral and bilateral
approaches.185

182 See John Whalley, China in the Word Trading System, 52 CESIFO ECON. STUD.
215, 226 (2006) (discussing how China’s trade policies and strategies have changed
since its membership in the WTO).
183 See Henry Gao, China’s Strategy for Free Trade Agreements: Political
Battle in the Name of Trade 17 (Dec. 8, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available
at
http://www.networkideas.org/ideasact/dec09/pdf/Henry_Gao.pdf
(analyzing China’s FTA and its impact on other Asian regions).
184
See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Schott, China and Doha, BEIJING REV.,
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2006-12/14/content_50751.htm
(last
updated Dec. 14, 2006) (noting that “China should work closely with other major
trading nations to ensure that the WTO talks re-engage and progress”).
185 See Interview with Vice Minister Yi Xiaozhun, supra note 78 (noting that Vice
Minister Yi Xiaozhun has stated that “China is walking by two legs”).
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6.1. Macro-Level Considerations and FTA Negotiation Strategies
6.1.1. Individualize Negotiation Strategy
As discussed previously, China’s FTA strategy is motivated by
several concerns, including the opening of markets for Chinese
exports, improving relations with its neighbors as part of China’s
smile diplomacy, and obtaining natural resources. China looks at
each FTA as a unique opportunity to secure a mutually
advantageous agreement, paying particular attention to what
China and the partner country can gain from the relationship. This
includes taking on obligations that may work to the short-term
detriment of Chinese citizens, including farmers, but may increase
goodwill with China’s neighbors, who are suspicious of the player
on the block. In contrast to the U.S. practice of using a model FTA,
China does not have a model FTA, and its FTAs vary from each
other both in form and coverage. This custom, in reality, “reflects
both a pragmatism in recognizing differences across partners, but
also the clear linkages being established between seemingly
conventional trade interests and China’s interests in wider
economic, diplomatic and strategic relationships.”186 Given the fact
that the objectives in each negotiation vary, it is advisable for
China to customize its negotiation strategy for each potential FTA
partner individually.187
With respect to long-term strategies, there is a long list of FTAs
under negotiation or consideration, although it seems that all of
them will take a long time to conclude for one reason or another.
FTAs under negotiation include the following: China-GCC (Gulf
Cooperation Council) FTA, 188 China-Australia FTA, 189 ChinaIceland FTA, China-Norway FTA,190 and China-SACU (Southern
Antkiewicz & Whalley, supra note 17, pt. 6.
See, e.g., Barfield, supra note 18, at 110 (discussing China’s “pragmatic”
FTA approach to negotiation that is “individually tailored to the needs and
priorities” of each country).
188 Energy security bears significant importance in the negotiations.
189 See, e.g., Yanning Yu, Trade Remedies: The Impact on the Proposed AustraliaChina Free Trade Agreement, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 267, 296 (2010) (emphasizing
that “the enactment of trade remedy measures in FTAs may relieve political
pressures that are imposed on negotiating parties to some degree during
negotiations and thus facilitate agreements”).
190 See Press Release, China FTA Network, Eighth Round Negotiation of
China-Norway FTA Held in Norway (Sept. 16, 2010), available at
186
187
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African Customs Union) FTA. Potential FTAs under consideration
include: China-India Regional Trade Arrangement Joint Feasibility
Study, China-Korea FTA Joint Feasibility Study, China-JapanKorea Joint Study, and China-Switzerland FTA Joint Study. It
seems that as long as those potential partners need China more
than China needs them, 191 China will have stronger bargaining
power in the negotiation process and can therefore afford to wait.
6.1.2. Continue Bilateral Negotiations while Simultaneously
Pushing for an East Asian FTA
Based on our analysis, we predict that the future of China’s
FTAs will continue to be bilateral. Though scholars and officials
occasionally speculate about an East Asian FTA or Asia-wide FTA,
such a plan would require difficult multilateral negotiations
among states that have not generated sufficient goodwill and trust.
Given the failure of multilateral trade negotiations at the WTO
level, it is unlikely that China, Japan, Korea, and ASEAN could
easily overcome historical and political enmities to join together.
Moreover, the U.S. trade initiative on the Trans-Pacific Partnership
Agreement has made the game even more complicated. Instead,
China will likely seek out small trade partners who possess
strategic interests for China, at least in the near future—whether on
the security front (like Pakistan), diplomatic front (like ASEAN), or
labor mobility front (like New Zealand).
However, with its rapid development in economy, it is a good
opportunity for China to push for an East Asia-wide FTA through
which to seize the leadership role in Asia. Indeed, there are
already various proposals for a region-wide FTA, including an East
Asia Free Trade Area among the ASEAN+3 countries and a
Comprehensive Economic Partnership for East Asia among the
ASEAN+6 countries. It is debatable whether it is desirable to
create a region-wide FTA by consolidating the plethora of bilateral
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enrelease/201009/3504_1.html (describing
negotiations between China and Norway “on such topics as trade in goods and
services, rules of origin, plants, plant hygienic standards, technical barriers to
trade, trade remedy and facilitation”)
191 See Press Release, China FTA Network, News Analysis ACFTA We Need
China More Than They Need Us (Apr. 20, 2010), available at
http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enrelease/201006/2939_1.html (noting that
China increasingly absorbs exports while traditional trade markets shrink creating
a reliance on China as a source of imports).
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and plurilateral FTAs. Scholars have divergent viewpoints. Some
argue that a region-wide FTA would generate much greater
benefits than the existing FTAs by increasing market size—and
therefore specialization and economies of scale—facilitating
investment and technology transfer, and simplifying tariff
schedules, rules, and standards. Moreover, the prior Asian
financial crisis has warned people in Asia that collective efforts are
needed when facing common challenges in the areas of trade and
investment. 192 Furthermore, an East Asian-wide FTA adopting a
uniform rule of origin will be administratively efficient to reduce
the “spaghetti bowl” effect in Asia.193 However, pessimists argue
that the countries of East Asia are too diverse to be able to agree on
an FTA. In any event, pushing for an Asia-wide FTA seems like a
plausible strategy for China to achieve its broader goal as the
regional leader in Asia.
6.1.3. Leverage the Hubbing Effect
Certain scholars have found that the hubbing effect plays an
important role in China’s FTA strategy.194 Many of China’s FTA
partners are important FTA hubs. So far, China has concluded
FTAs, or entered into negotiations, with almost every major region
in the world, including Europe (Iceland and Norway), America
(Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica), the Middle East (GCC), Africa
(SACU), East Asia (Korea), Southeast Asia (ASEAN and
Singapore), South Asia (Pakistan and India), and Oceania (New
Zealand and Australia). By entering FTAs with those partners who
are FTA hubs, China could potentially tap into the broader markets
created by FTA arrangements already in place.195

192 See Kawai & Wignaraja, supra note 30, at 7 (discussing how “a region-wide
FTA may make it easier to achieve” WTO trade deals because regional agreements
would already encompass issues about agricultural and industrial goods).
193 See id. at 5–7 (arguing that the “spaghetti bowl” of “overlapping and
complex FTAs in East Asia” created an “explosion of deals” and tariffs that have
increased transaction costs significantly for small and medium-sized enterprises,
those who can least afford them).
194 See Gao, supra note 183, at 9–10 (stating that the hubbing effect seems to be
more important than domestic market size in determining China’s FTA strategy).
195 See id. at 10 (explaining that entering in RTAs with countries who are
members of the EFTA, EEA, and SAARC is a cost-effective method of “exploring
new markets” and could potentially lead to entrance into larger markets).
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6.1.4. Speed is Precious
With the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement coming into
force, “there is a growing fear in Japan that ASEAN countries will
gradually become China’s backyard.”196 Moreover, depending on
how fully the FTA is implemented, the China-ASEAN FTA might
place the United States at an economic disadvantage. The Obama
Administration needs to push Congress to renew the Trade
Promotion Authority in order for FTAs successfully negotiated by
U.S. trade representatives to be approved by Congress. As a result,
China should try to make FTA arrangements as quickly as possible
to get an edge in the region.
6.1.5. Artfully Handle FTAs and BITs
Unlike prior practice, where FTAs and BITs were used as two
separate and parallel legal instruments to address trade and
investment issues, respectively, it is currently not unusual to find
an investment chapter in FTAs. As a result, there is a possibility
that countries will have to face a more comprehensive mode of
negotiations where both trade and investment issues are on the
negotiation table at once. For instance, the United States has
successfully used its leverage to gain “access in key service sectors
in partner countries in return for accelerated bilateral tariff
elimination. “197 Similarly, China needs to analyze carefully what it
can offer and what it can gain in both trade and investment. In the
situation where potential partners need China more than China
needs them in terms of trade,198 China should try to negotiate trade
and investment matters all at once and should be able to use the
leverage to request more from its counterpart. In addition, “[f]rom
an administrative perspective, a comprehensive inclusion of
investment matters into an FTA . . . [might] reduce the costs of
administrating bilateral economic relations.”199 Moreover, it is a
196 The China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Who’s Happy, Who’s Not, supra
note 96.
197 Antkiewicz & Whalley, supra note 17, pt. 1 (citation omitted).
198 See, e.g., Press Release, China FTA Network, supra note 191 (stating that
capital goods and intermediate goods imported from China are necessary for
Indonesian industries to “operate and grow”).
199 Chang-fa Lo, A Comparison of BIT and the Investment Chapter of Free Trade
Agreement from Policy Perspective, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 147,
167 (2008).
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good way for China to make sure that it can invest and
subsequently control strategic resources.
Should China decide to incorporate an investment chapter into
an FTA, it needs to pay attention to two important issues. First,
China should be especially cautious in affording pre-investment
national treatment to foreign investors, simply because preinvestment national treatment “can bring about more far-reaching
influence upon [the] host state than post-establishment [national
treatment].”200 Second, given that it is unclear whether an investor
may rely on an MFN clause to invoke the dispute settlement
provisions of a third-party treaty that are relatively more favorable
to the investor, 201 it is advisable for China to exclude the
application of MFN on dispute settlement provisions at the
moment.
6.1.6. Continue to Seek Market Economy Status from FTA Partners
China’s status as an economy in transition has put China at a
significant disadvantage in the anti-dumping investigations.202 As
a result, China has been seeking recognition of market economy
status from individual countries through various ways. Among
them, using this recognition as a precondition to start FTA
negotiations is a sound strategy. In fact, as more and more
economies recognize China’s market economy status, there would
be pressure on those stubborn ones who still deem China a nonmarket economy.

Congyan, supra note 93, at 472 (2009).
See, e.g., Yannick Radi, The Application of the Most-Favoured-Nation Clause to
the Dispute Settlement Provisions of Bilateral Investment Treaties: Domesticating the
“Trojan Horse,” 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 757, 764 (2007) (evaluating arguments on the
applicability of the most-favored-nation clause to the dispute settlement
provisions of bilateral investment treaties and arguing that the former nearly
always covers the latter); Scott Vesel, Clearing a Path Through a Tangled
Jurisprudence: Most-Favored-Nation Clauses and Dispute Settlement Provisions in
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 125, 126 (2007) (citing that
international law presents different MFN clauses in different treaties, rather than
having any single convergence and interpretation that investors can rely upon).
202 See Andrew L. Stoler, Exec. Dir., Inst. for Int’l Bus., Econ. & Law,
Treatment of China as a Non-Market Economy: Implications for Antidumping
and Countervailing Measures and Impact on Chinese Company Operations in the
WTO Framework 1 (Dec. 1–2, 2003), http://www.iit.adelaide.edu.au
/docs/Shanghai%20Speech.pdf (indicating that China has retained its status as a
non-market economy and is treated as such by other WTO members).
200
201
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6.1.7. Establish an Effective Dispute Settlement and Enforcement
Mechanism
An efficient dispute resolution mechanism is paramount to
successful arrangement of a free trade agreement. As mentioned
previously, nowadays, lots of FTAs cover both trade and
investment matters. Given the different nature of trade and
investment, they warrant differentiated dispute mechanisms. As
Alan O. Sykes has insightfully pointed out, a private right of action
for money damages is particularly valuable in the international
investment arena,where the objective is to lower the cost of capital
for new investments. This objective is absent in trade matters
where “trading nations will often prefer to act as political filters”
and deny private enforcement actions that can lessen political
welfare. 203 Here, the dispute settlement mechanism under the
NAFTA framework is a good example to follow.
Moreover, a dispute arising under an FTA is also likely to be
covered by the WTO Agreement and the dispute settlement
mechanism as stipulated in BITs. To avoid such possible parallel
proceedings, it is advisable to include a “single forum”
requirement per Article 2005 of Chapter 20 in NAFTA,204 which
essentially requires the parties to choose one forum to solve the
disputes.
6.2. Coordinate Domestic Institutions and Companies
For firms using FTAs, institutional support from government
agencies 205 and non-governmental agencies such as business
associations is important. Some estimate that the low utilization
ratio of China’s FTAs in certain areas may be due to a lack of
203
See Alan O. Sykes, Public Versus Private Enforcement of International
Economic Law: Standing and Remedy, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 631, 631 (2005) (developing
“a theory of the rules regarding standing and remedy in international trade and
investment agreements”).
204 See North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., art. 2005, Dec.
17, 1992, 20 I.L.M. 3 (1993), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net
/nafta/chap-20.pdf (indicating that any agreement negotiated may be settled at
the forum of either party “at the discretion of the complaining party”).
205 The main government agencies involved in assisting firms with issues
regarding FTA usage and certificate of origin applications in the PRC are the
Ministry of Commerce (including local departments of commerce), China
Customs, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other agencies such as the State
General Administration for Quality Supervision, Inspection, and Quarantine.
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awareness about existing FTAs and the benefits, and a lack of
information on the relevant rules. 206 A study indicates that the
Ministry of Commerce and China Customs have important roles to
play in helping firms to use FTAs for exports and therefore should
strengthen their capacities to support the business community’s
use of FTAs for exports and the expansion of services and FDI
flows. 207 Non-governmental agencies, such as law firms and
private consultants, are another source of assistance for firms.
Importantly, to address the firms’ concerns, more efforts
should be made to improve the assistance available for making the
best use of the signed FTAs. Special programs and institutions
should be developed to provide FTA-related information, training,
and consulting services for China’s corporations. “An electronic
information exchange and sharing mechanism should be built by”
governmental and non-governmental agencies cooperatively “in
order to maximize the utilization of services provided by both the
public and private sectors.”208
Lack of communication and difficulty of interagency
coordination, particularly between the Ministry of Commerce and
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, have significantly reduced
administrative efficiency in handling FTA related matters. As a
result, establishing an FTA taskforce made of representatives of
key government agencies would be an efficient way to facilitate
domestic coordination.209

206
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CHINA’S FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS:
LOWERING LANDED COSTS AND GAINING COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE 3, available at
http://www.pwccustoms.com/webmedia/doc/633910492656405807_fta_lower_l
and_cost.pdf (noting that companies need to proactively plan and put into place
new processes to take advantage of the, as of now underutilized, Chinese FTA
system).
207 See Yunling Zhang, The Impact of Free Trade Agreements on Business Activity:
A Survey of Firms in the People’s Republic of China 23–4 (Asian Dev. Bank Inst.,
Working Paper No. 251, 2010), available at http://www.adbi.org/files
/2010.10.12.wp251.impact.fta.business.activity.prc.pdf (suggesting that more
effort should be made by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce, the China Council
for the Promotion of International Trade, and the China Chamber of International
Commerce, to address the concerns of firms in utilizing FTAs).
208 See id. at 27 (making policy recommendations based on the study’s
findings).
209 See Zhang Fan (张帆), Lun Goujian Zhongguo de FTA Zhanlüe (论构建中
国的FTA战略) [On Establishing China’s FTA Strategy], 5 KAIFANG DAOBAO (开放导
报 ) [CHINA OPENING HERALD], 74 (2004) (demonstrating the significance of
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As argued before, an effective and efficient dispute settlement
mechanism is essential for the success of FTAs. However, under
most FTAs, a private party who is unsatisfied with the measures
adopted by a government can only report the matter to his own
government, who will conduct a multifaceted balancing (taking
into account economic and political concerns) and then decide
whether to raise the matter with the other government. As a result,
smooth exchange of information and cogent cooperation between
governmental agencies and private parties are crucial to ensure
efficient conflict resolution under the framework of FTAs. In order
to facilitate cooperation between public and private sectors to solve
the problem of information asymmetry arising out of different
objectives between both sectors, this Article tries to promote a
workable formula and information filter mechanism for the trade
agency to prioritize petitions.
7.

CONCLUSION

China’s trade policy and FTA strategy has significant
implications for all, whether inside or outside of China.
Multilateralism (such as WTO) and regionalism (such as FTAs) are
the two major paths for international trade. China needs to
continue to “walk on two legs:” China needs to participate more
proactively in the rulemaking of multilateral negotiations on
international trade while making full use of FTAs (as part of its
larger political and diplomatic framework) to influence the
international environment.

establishing China’s FTA strategy, analyzing the strategy’s basic structure, and
proposing feasible ways to implement the strategy in China).
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APPENDIX 1
Signing Parties
The People’s
Republic of
Bangladesh, the
People’s Republic of
China, the Republic
of India, the Lao
People’s Democratic
Republic, the
Republic of Korea,
and the Democratic
Socialist Republic of
Sri Lanka

Implementation
Date
2006.9.1

The People’s
Republic of China
and the Republic of
Costa Rica

2010.4.8

The People’s
Republic of China
and the Republic of
Peru

2010.3.1

The People’s
Republic of China
and the Republic of
Singapore

2009.1.1
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Name of the
Agreement
Asia-Pacific Trade
Agreement

The Free Trade
Agreement between
the Government of the
People’s Republic of
China and the
Government of the
Republic of Costa Rica
The Free Trade
Agreement between
the Government of the
People’s Republic of
China and the
Government of the
Republic of Peru
The Free Trade
Agreement between
the Government of the
People’s Republic of
China and the
Government of the
Republic of Singapore

02 ZHAO WEBSTER (DO NOT DELETE)

118

10/31/2011 7:34 PM

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 33:1

The People’s
Republic of China
and New Zealand

2008.10.1

The Free Trade
Agreement between
the Government of the
People’s Republic of
China and the
Government of New
Zealand

The People’s
Republic of China
and the Republic of
Chile

2006.10.1

The People’s
Republic of China
and the Islamic of
Pakistan

2009.10.10

The Free Trade
Agreement between
the Government of the
People’s Republic of
China and the
Government of the
Republic of Chile
The Free Trade
Agreement between
the Government of the
People’s Republic of
China and the
Government of the
Islamic Republic of
Pakistan

The People’s
Republic of China
and Brunei
Darussalam, the
Kingdom of
Cambodia, the
Republic of
Indonesia, the Lao
People’s Democratic
Republic Malaysia,
the Union of
Myanmar, the
Republic of the
Philippines, the
Republic of
Singapore, the
Kingdom of
Thailand and the
Socialist Republic
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2010.1.1

Framework
Agreement on
Comprehensive
Economic CoOperation between the
People’s Republic of
China and the
Association of South
East Asian Nations
(2002), Agreement on
Trade in Goods of the
Framework
Agreement on
Comprehensive
Economic
Co-Operation between
the People’s Republic
of China and the
Association of South
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of Viet Nam,
Member States of
the Association of
Southeast Asian
Nations
(collectively,
ASEAN)

Mainland China
and Hong Kong,
Macao SAR
Government

2003

Mainland China
and Taiwan

2010.6.29
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East Asian Nations
(2004), Agreement on
Trade in Services of
the Framework
Agreement on
Comprehensive
Economic
Co-Operation between
the People’s Republic
of China and the
Association of South
East Asian Nations
(2007)
Closer Economic
Partnership
Arrangement (2003),
various
supplementary
agreements
Economic Cooperation
Framework
Agreement

